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Letter from the Editor

Letter from the Editor
On behalf of the entire editorial board, I am honored
to present the newest issue of the Penn History Review.
Since 1991, the Penn History Review has been dedicated
to promoting the study of history amongst undergraduate
students. Since its founding, PHR has published exceptional
historical scholarship written by students at the University of
Pennsylvania as well as schools across the United States. Our
spring 2021 edition exemplifies the diversity of study within
our field. It includes articles that explore dynamic topics such
as municipal politics in Civil War America, nineteenth century
American railroad accounting, Mexican foreign policy, and
the Ptolemaic state. These pieces embody the core values
of our publication: curiosity, critical thinking, a dedication
to research, and most importantly, a passion for history. Our
entire editorial team deeply enjoyed working with the authors
and editing these papers. We hope that you will find them
thought-provoking and enjoy reading them as much as we did!
Our first piece, “Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban
America: a Comparative Study of NYC and Philadelphia
Politics” is authored by Justin Greenman. Excerpted from a
longer piece, he analyzes the municipal politics of the two
cities during the American Civil War, particularly with regard
to the two mayors: Fernando Wood and Alexander Henry.
In the next article “American Railroad Accounting
Practices in the Nineteenth Century,” William Zimmermann
analyzes the emergence of modern accounting practices
in nineteenth century railroads. The author claims that
the industry’s changing standards can be viewed as a
proxy for and bellwether for American business writ large.
In the third paper, “Mexico’s Cuban Connection:
An Exception or Example of the United States’ Ardent Anti
Communism,” Victoria Saeki-Serna of Rice University
6
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analyzes US-Mexico relations during the Cold War. The
author claims that Mexico took a significantly softer line
towards Havana than the US would have liked, but the US
overlooked it in the interest of Mexican domestic stability.
Our final piece, “Ptolemaic-Egyptian Collaboration
and the Weak State Problem”, comes from Alan Clingan of the
University of Maryland, College Park. The author, writing
on a subject area rarely covered in this journal, discusses the
relationship between the ruling, ethnically Greek, Ptolemaic
dynasty and the native Egyptians in antiquity. The author
argues that the early Ptolemaic state, in particular, revolved
around a weak state that relied on native Egyptian collaborators.
Additionally, this issue includes a sample of abstracts
submitted by seniors at Penn who undertook the challenge of
writing honors theses for the History Department. In doing so,
PHR hopes to promote additional research and scholarship
in the field of history by offering its readership a preview
of this fascinating variety of topics. Congratulations to all
of the senior honors students who achieved this impressive
accomplishment. We encourage other history students
to also embark on this incredibly rewarding endeavour.
The editorial board would also like to thank a number
of people without whom this edition of the PHR would not
have been possible. Our publication only exists thanks to
the generous support of the Penn History Department who
continues to support and fund us each year. In particular, we
are extremely grateful to Dr. Siyen Fei, the Undergraduate
Chair of the department, and Dr. Yvonne Fabella, the Associate
Director of Undergraduate Studies. They have both offered
invaluable guidance and encouragement throughout the
editing and publishing processes. The dedication they have
for both their students and field of study is an inspiration. In
addition, we would like to thank the faculty members at Penn
and other universities who promoted our publication, as well
as all of the students who submitted papers for consideration.
Penn History Review
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This edition would not exist without your support. Thank
you as well to our contributing authors, who worked
patiently and diligently to refine their articles for publication.
Finally, I would like to thank our editors for their
exceptionally hard work on this issue of the Penn History
Review. I would especially like to recognize the contributions
of our three graduating seniors: Lorenza Colagrossi, Logan
Nantais, and Spencer Swanson. Their passion for history and
dedication over the years have continued to make the PHR
a platform for remarkable scholarship. It has been a truly
enjoyable experience to work with each of them throughout my
time on the board. We will miss having them in our editorial
family but are confident that they will go on to do great things.
In particular, I would like to thank Lorenza Colagrossi,
our incredible Editor-in-Chief Emeritus. I am deeply indebted
to her and have had the great privilege of learning from her
and studying alongside her. She is brilliant, hard-working,
and kind. Lorenza, thank you for the constant guidance,
support, and dedication to everything you do. Now that
you are moving on, I have no doubt that you will bring
these attributes with you to your next great endeavor. It has
truly been an honor to work with you. PHR will eternally
be a stronger publication because it had you as a leader,
particularly through these trying times. Last year, when
campus closed down and we were forced online, you did not
miss a beat and PHR continued to publish. At the same time, I
would like to recognize three new editors we were especially
fortunate to have added to the board this semester, Nicholas
Williams, Hannah De Oliveira and Keyvan Farmanfarmaian.
They have already made a positive impact on our journal.
This year marks PHR’s 30th anniversary as a
publication. I am honored to be the Editor-in-Chief during
this milestone year and deeply grateful to all those who
have kept PHR going into its fourth decade and who I
am sure will keeping it going for many more: the Penn
8
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History Department for providing funding and support,
the countless authors and editors who have worked on past
editions and, of course, my predecessors as Editor-in-Chief.
Congratulations again to all of the authors and editors
who participated in this edition of the Penn History Review!

Eden Vance
Editor-in-Chief
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Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban America: A Comparative Study of New York
City and philadelphia Politics
Justin Greenman
Introduction:
The decades before the American Civil War would be a
period of great change for America’s two largest cities, New York
City and Philadelphia. At the turn of the 19th century, New York
City was still socially homogenous, with few immigrants and a
uniform, simple economy. But, as its economic and social power
grew with the development of new industries and the growth
of interstate commerce, immigration to the city skyrocketed.
Immigrants flooded the physically expanding city from New
England, from the countryside of upstate New York, and from
overseas, to the point where by 1860 it had 813,660 residents.
Thus, by 1860 New York City was America’s financial and social
capital, the “capital of capital” as historian John Strausbaugh
put it.1 1860 Philadelphia had a population of 565,529, behind
only London, Paris, and New York City. Like New York City and
most northern metropolises, its immigrants were primarily Irish
and German (16.7 and 7.5 percent in Philadelphia, respectively.)
However, unlike New York City, it had a vibrant native-born
citizenry, whether anti-slavery heirs of the City of Brotherly
Love’s Quaker founders, members of its 400 churches and nearly
one thousand organized lodges, clubs, and benefit associations,
or Southern businessmen moving North for greater economic
opportunities.2 For these long-time Philadelphia residents, the
Civil War, and the resulting political and social changes to their
city, would be a time of reckoning for their long-held beliefs.
As national centers of commerce and society, New York
City and Philadelphia are crucial to understanding the national
10
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political and ideological changes and movements that occurred
during the Civil War. Throughout the war, both cities would
serve as microcosms for the political and ideological changes
that befell the rest of the Union. In the historical memory and
common knowledge of New York City and Philadelphia during
the war, the two cities have acquired contrasting perceptions.
New York City, in large part thanks to its well-documented
draft riots, is perceived as a disloyal, racist city. Philadelphia,
in large part thanks to its colonial legacy and lack of similar
riots or anti-Lincoln actions, is perceived as a loyal and pro-war
city. In reality, however, the truth about each city’s loyalty and
disloyalty is somewhere between the reputations given to them
by the passage of time. Neither New York City nor Philadelphia
fit into the perfect picture of the “loyal city” or “disloyal city”
that they have been placed into by popular memory. Both cities
faced pitched electoral clashes that could have easily taken their
cities in different political directions, and no political outcome
in either city was preordained.
Comparatively studying New York City and
Philadelphia revealed the fascinating differences with which
politically active citizens, especially elected officials and
party leaders, positioned themselves in relation to the war
effort. Yet, one facet that united political actors divided by
different viewpoints and residing in different cities was their
use of definitions of loyalty and disloyalty. Analyzing either
city through definitions of loyalty and disloyalty is a rare
historiographical occurrence; nevertheless, conceptions of
loyalty and disloyalty are crucial for this study. In a conflict as
divisive as the Civil War, both cities were split between many
vocal factions that argued they were the only ones truly loyal
to the nation while their opponents were just disloyal agitators.
They also sought to control and alter situations when the
disloyalty label was directed at them. Thus, this work will be a
critical reinterpretation of how we, now over 155 years since the
end of the Civil War, see those who practiced politics in New
Penn History Review
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York City and Philadelphia during the conflict.
Even those actors already given some scholarly
treatment deserve to be recontextualized within the framework
of loyalty and disloyalty. The New York City or Philadelphia
leader who receives the most scholarly treatment is Fernando
Wood. Twice elected mayor of New York City, including serving
as its first war-time mayor, and later a congressman, Wood is
the focus of two well-researched books, various articles, and
plays an integral role in most stories of New York City during
the war. While most of the works repeat facts and arguments
about his life story, there is a notable disagreement that this
thesis will relitigate and seek to solve. Was Wood a disloyal,
political opportunist masking or deploying his opposition to
the war at different times when it was politically advantageous,
or was he a loyal leader who stuck by his principles even forced
to adapt to changing circumstances like everyone else? All in
all, through Wood’s winding wartime career while there were
shades of the latter, he was a politician first, willing to sacrifice
his party and principles, and in one case his state’s safety, for
political gain. Other political actors of different degrees of
notoriety will also be recontextualized within this question, and
while they all were political opportunists to varying degrees,
none were as overtly duplicitous as Wood was.
Beyond Wood, both cities are also filled with partisan
actors seeking to utilize the Civil War to push forward their
vision for their city. While there are too many to cover in detail,
this work will examine many based on their connections to
the different intraparty factions of both cities. The politics of
both cities were defined by constant party feuds that at times
allowed for political and electoral success, but most often led
to disaster. The New York City Democratic Party alone had
three powerful factions, Tammany Hall, Mozart Hall, and the
McKeon Democracy, all of whom will receive their due. New
York City Republicans were divided between a more moderate
faction led by New York Times editor Henry Raymond and a
12
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more radical faction led by New York Tribune editor Horace
Greeley. At different points in the war, these factions stood
for different positions and achieved different levels of success.
For instance, while Raymond’s faction originally opposed
President Lincoln’s policies, by war’s end they were amongst
his most powerful backers. Greeley’s faction helped deliver him
the 1860 Republican nomination and then soured on him as
the war progressed. The reason for this shift will be examined,
occurring based on the evolving popularity of Lincoln and his
wartime policies, and what they meant for this intraparty power
struggle. Philadelphia, on the other hand, was less defined by
interparty or intraparty feuds. Rather, it was characterized more
by a divide between a bipartisan, pro-war consensus under
Alexander Henry and out-of-power Democrats and Republicans
who wanted a seat at the table but were never popular enough
to receive one. The reason for this composition of Philadelphia
politics will be examined. All in all, Henry’s desire for
bipartisanship and consensus was successful, in large part due
to a healthy use of police power, which allowed Philadelphia to
avoid most of the divisiveness and bloodshed that befell New
York City.
Besides political leaders, and their parties and coalitions,
there are other key avenues to understand the intersections of
the cities. For example, both cities had a rich heterogeneous
mix of newspapers that were important for the politicization
of those who led and were led alike. In 19th century America,
newspapers were crucial prognosticators and disseminators of
political thought, allowing everyday citizens, regardless of their
education or political knowledge, to glean their own personal
views from the opinions of their favorite newspaper. As Edward
Dicey, a British journalist visiting America during the Civil
War, put it, “In truth, the most remarkable feature about
the American press is its quantity rather than its quality. The
American might be defined as a newspaper-reading animal…
Reading is so universal an acquirement here, that a far larger,
Penn History Review
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and also a far lower, class reads the newspapers than is the
case with us.”3 The papers, whether affiliated with politically
independent or with a party or faction, still hoped to influence
political parties and leaders. New York City especially was
dominated by an ideological battle between its three most
influential newspapers: Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune,
Henry Raymond’s New York Times, and Fernando Wood’s New
York Daily News. Their constant battle to define themselves
as loyal, and their competitors (and thus their competitors’
readers) as disloyal would demonstrate the simmering tension
between New York City’s ideological and ethnic communities.
Due to their ties to a party faction, these newspapers
successfully captured the views of their faction and its
struggles, or outright refusal, to adjust as the national political
circumstances changed. On the other hand, Philadelphia’s
papers, while ideological, had few connections to organized
politics, and thus politically evolved with much of the country
as the war progressed.
This section, of a larger work encompassing the years
1859-1865, covers 1859-1861, examining how the quick
rhetorical shifting, by both parties, from opposition to civil
war to full-throated pro-war, anti-South oratory obscured
real political divisions about loyalty. While in the end loyalty
as constructed as supporting Lincoln and the war effort fully
would win out in both cities over loyalty as constructed as
supporting a party or a pre-war national construct, it was by
no means an easy decision for either city and for those who
led them. At times, the first construction would even be the
most unpopular view of loyalty, especially during periods
of Democratic control and when the Union war effort was
struggling the most. By the end of the war, while many of the
political leaders and factions evolved with their city’s residents
towards the first definition of loyalty, others would refuse to
evolve despite great pressure, to varying degrees of negative
electoral and personal consequences. In that case, the differences
14

Justin Greenman

Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban America

between the cities plays a deciding role, where in New York
City those who sought bipartisanship failed completely,
while their counterparts in Philadelphia succeeded. Likewise,
while Democrats virtually disappeared from elected office in
Philadelphia, in New York City they ruled for most of the war,
even after a significant portion of their base rioted in the streets.
In truth, throughout the war there was no simple
answer about what loyalty and disloyalty meant. Many in both
parties would vehemently resist any definition but their own.
While I know that my work will not lead to a simple answer
about the roles of loyalty and disloyalty in political action and
discourse, I hope that my use of the best of the scholarship
combined with primary sources to fill its gaping holes will help
conclude that one’s loyalty and disloyalty could not be judged
by one’s partisan identification or political allies. It especially
cannot be judged by one’s rhetoric, which was often vague at
best and deceitful of one’s true intentions at worst. In fact, if
there is one conclusion that this paper easily makes, it is that
there were no universally agreed upon, or even mostly agreed
upon, definitions of what constituted loyalty and disloyalty,
only subjective opinions altered by time and animated by
politics.
New York City and Philadelphia: The Early Days of the Split
For New York City and Philadelphia Democrats
and Republicans leaders alike, April 12th, 1861 would mark
a turning point from their pre-war attitudes towards the
Union, secession, and other contentious issues. Democrats
and Republicans, and their powerful political and media
leaders, would immediately walk back much of the criticism
they leveled at President Lincoln and the possibility of war.
Both sides would go to great lengths to trumpet their loyalty
to the war effort, seeking to outflank their opponents as the
most loyal. It appeared that the coming of war would bring
Penn History Review
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an end to the discordant Northern politics of the 1850s and
usher in a new era of bipartisan cooperation. But, these public
demonstrations of agreement would be both short-lived and
ultimately unsuccessful attempts at unity. By the end of the
year, interparty and intraparty rivalries would resume, with
efforts by politicians in both parties to denigrate others as
disloyal to the war effort when it was still broadly popular
and to highlight their own ideological principles to their
supporters once it was not. These divisions in New York City
and Philadelphia would be magnified by the contentious and
divisive city elections in 1861, setting the stage for an even
more contentious and divisive 1862.
However, to best understand where both parties and
their heterogeneous factions would end up by 1862, it is
necessary first to determine where they started. For both cities,
the years immediately preceding the war were marked by
political turbulence. Old political alliances and ideologies were
chaotically rejected and replaced, as different groups and ideas
jockeyed for power. The result would be the transformation of
Philadelphia into a one-party city, a party defined by support
for the Union over traditional party lines, though with a
sizable minority of Democrats and Republicans opposing
the consensus, and of New York City into a city politically
partitioned into three nearly equal parts. Thus, even though
both cities entered the war in relatively similar ideological
positions, they would, thanks to these wartime dynamics, exit
the year completely dissimilar.
For a city north of the Mason-Dixon line, pre-war
Philadelphia was in many ways a Southern city. With its
manufacturing capital greater than the combination of 11
states that would become the Confederacy, it received great
economic investment from wealthy Southerners. These
Southerners did not just send money to Philadelphia; in fact,
many Southerners married into Philadelphia families and
directed their manufacturing empires from within the city. They
16
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then employed poor whites, often immigrants, and allied with
them politically by focusing on a supposedly shared hatred for
the city’s growing free black population. For decades before
the war, these ties to the South manifested in clear voting
preferences for Southern economic interests and led to massive
Democratic electoral success in the city. In the city’s 1856
presidential election, Republican John C. Fremont received
11% of the vote, with the Democrats procuring a majority, and
its burgeoning Know-Nothing Party forced to suppress many
of its anti-slavery supporters.4 As Charles Godfrey Leland, a
Philadelphia satirist, put it, “everything Southern was exalted
and worshipped.”5
One example of something Southern exalted in
Philadelphia was fear and, in many, overt hatred towards the
city’s free blacks. As previously established, some of the hatred
felt by the city’s workers towards black residents was promoted
by direct propaganda from the city’s Southern business leaders.
Yet, most of the hatred felt by Philadelphians of all walks of
life towards free blacks came from their unmistakable presence,
constituting four percent of Philadelphia’s population. Though
on the surface small, they were the largest black community in
the North, and second only to Baltimore’s. Furthermore, they
disproportionately lived in wards closest to the city’s major
political and social institutions and often worked in economic
sectors like menial labor and domestic work that kept them
in poverty and near the city elite.6 Thus it is clear that in
Philadelphia, the controversy over black rights in city society, or
lack thereof, was more omnipresent than seemingly far-fetched
fears of secession or unrelatable issues like Bleeding Kansas.
Yet in pre-war Philadelphia, free blacks were more than
just a nuisance or something to fear; they were also a direct
target of restrictive political measures. Blacks were stuck in
low-level menial labor or domestic work because of economic
restrictions passed by Southern-allied Democrats and supported
by the white worker base. Employment in new factories built
Penn History Review
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by Southerners was closed to blacks, membership in trade
groups was barred, and Democratic state legislatures mandated
separate schools for blacks long before Plessy vs. Ferguson.7
While New York City has a more developed reputation for
racism during the era, contemporary abolitionists actually
thought Philadelphia was worse. The abolitionist William
Wells Brown said that in Philadelphia, “Colorphobia is more
rampant here than in the pro-slavery, negro-hating city of New
York.”8 Frederick Douglass went even further, saying “There
is not perhaps anywhere to be found a city in which prejudice
against color is more rampant than in Philadelphia...The whole
aspect of city usage at this point is mean, contemptible, and
barbarous…”9 Unfortunately, even the war would not alter
many of these obstructions and the city’s views of blacks would
alter the rhetoric and policies of even more or less sympathetic
political leadership.
The rise to power of an opposition party after such
a Democratic landslide in 1856 illustrated how quickly new
alliances could be created, be successful, and then immediately
face the possibility of dissolution. It may be surprising that
out of this virulently pro-Democrat, pro-South, and anti-black
political structure, the Democratic Party would be displaced
just two years later by an upstart party that stood against most
of its core tenets. But, in reality, this displacement marked a
major political realignment that befell much of the North,
but especially Philadelphia. In the wake of Bleeding Kansas in
1855 and the Dred Scott Supreme Court case in 1857, new
political coalitions were formed across the North to oppose
the Democratic Party and its increasing agreement with the
Southern ideology on slavery. Compromised of disaffected
Democrats, former Whigs, nativists, and Free Soilers, these
coalitions often struggled to succeed because of disagreements
over the extent to which growing anti-slavery and antiimmigration ideologies should be emphasized. Those in
Philadelphia came together in 1857 to form a new political
18

Justin Greenman

Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban America

party, the Peoples Party.
The Peoples Party avoided the fate that befell other antiDemocrat coalitions by promising to ignore both slavery and
nativism. They would only support popular sovereignty, not
even abolition in new territories, and nativists would have to
be satisfied with a lip-service plank of “Protection of American
Labor against the Pauper Labor of Europe.”10 Rather than
focus on what divided them, they focused on what they agreed
on: the party portrayed Democrats as the aggressors on the
question of slavery in an appeal to those who may nominally
be Democrats, but still worried that slavery was bringing the
country to the brink of Civil War.11 The Democratic Party
was still a strong force, castigating the Peoples Party as the
“‘Mulatto’ Party, offspring of miscegenation between the
Americans and ‘Black Republicans.’” One Democratic speaker
at an 1858 rally even argued that if the Peoples Party won, the
state should go with the South before Republicans destroyed
the national confederacy.12 Yet, in 1858 the new party would
notch its first major electoral success, defeating the incumbent
Democratic mayor and replacing him with one of their own,
Alexander Henry. Therefore, it is clear that while Philadelphia
had many Southern inclinations, they would not remain fully
intact as the Civil War approached.
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Alexander Henry, unknown author and
date.

Alexander Henry, a wealthy young lawyer, hoped his
term could avoid controversy while using his power to focus
on his main legislative priority: improving the city’s public
transportation. That his main policy goal was completely
divorced from national politics reveals the tightrope that the
Peoples Party sought to walk. Despite his victory, however,
Henry’s influence and power over the city was tenuous at best.
At any moment, the fragile alliance that brought him to power
could collapse over internal divisions, allowing the Democratic
Party to regain its usual power. Furthermore, the Peoples
Party cannot be equated with the Republican Party; a separate
political organization used the Republican name to push Henry
and his allies towards a more candid antislavery position.13 His
balancing act became more difficult after John Brown’s raid
the next year. The raid would greatly polarize Philadelphia,
convincing the city’s previously quiet abolitionists to schedule
a public meeting at Independence Hall on the day of his
execution. The audience at the meeting was divided between
20
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abolitionists, black residents, and Southern sympathizers, and
order was only ensured by the 120 policemen sent by Mayor
Henry to attend the event. He would later use the police again
to bar abolitionists from meeting Brown’s body when it passed
through the city after his death and to stop Democrats from
attacking New York abolitionist George Curtis as he lectured at
the Pennsylvania Anti-Slavery Fair.14
Henry’s use of the city’s police force to maintain calm
between divided factions would later become a hallmark
of his administration and of the power of the Philadelphia
mayoralty. The roots of this power actually came from a
recent development in Philadelphia’s political and geographic
evolution. In 1854, Philadelphia consolidated its outlying
communities. Primarily intended to enlarge Philadelphia’s tax
base, this consolidation also realigned political power around its
executive and away from its city council. One key example of
the increased power of the Philadelphia mayoralty was regarding
the police. Now, each ward had its own police station under the
supervision of a central station at City Hall, which the mayor
controlled. Henry’s predecessors had already tested out the
new police powers, first with the nativist and prohibitionist
Robert Conrad suppressing Sunday newspapers and liquor
sales.15 Out of this recent expansion would come Henry’s key
mechanism for guiding his city through its darkest hours. The
fact that wartime New York City had no such power vested in
its mayor would one day restrain the leadership efforts of its
non-Democratic leadership.
Despite trying to evenly utilize force against and on
behalf of all political factions, Henry’s measures were wildly
unpopular with much of the city in 1859 and into 1860.
Democratic opponents saw him as a closet abolitionist who
should have instead suppressed the anti-slavery meetings. Henry
seemingly supported this argument by joining Curtis on stage at
his lecture as a symbol of municipal authority and fairness. He
was quickly rebuked in a 16-5 vote by the city’s Select Council,
Penn History Review
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and about a third of the city’s medical students from the South
withdrew from their schools in protest. His political allies were
not much better at supporting him, with many joining the
city’s Republican Party rather than continue suppressing their
views on issues surrounding slavery.16 Pushed in from both
parties, Henry’s power nearly evaporated. Based on precinct
returns from the May 1860 election for the mayoral race, A.K.
McClure, a prominent Philadelphia Republican politician
during the war and an ally of Henry, admitted years later that
Henry was only re-elected because of falsified election returns,
though there is no direct evidence of voter fraud or of Henry’s
knowledge of any falsification.17 Perhaps to show he was still
moderate, or out of legitimate ideological desires, Henry would
end up supporting the Constitution Unionist, John Bell, over
the Republican, Abraham Lincoln, in the 1860 presidential
election. However, the latter’s large victory in the city, a sign
of its continued drift away from the Democratic Party, would
serve as a warning. For the mayor, his power as 1861 began was
a far cry from the mandate he was seemingly given just three
years earlier.
Democrats in the city also refused to give him or
the Peoples Party room to reassure the city that they wanted
reconciliation following Lincoln’s election and the secession
of Southern states. On January 17th, Democrats held a mass
meeting in which they supported Southern secession. One
of the keynote speakers was William Bradford Reed, perhaps
at the pinnacle of his power. Born into Philadelphia’s social
elite, his grandfather served as Pennsylvania’s governor during
the Revolutionary War, even as he was accused of directly
communicating with King George III to betray his erstwhile
friend George Washington. Originally an Anti-Mason and later
a Whig, William Reed quickly irritated friend and foe alike.
As historian Joanna Cowden put it in a very unsympathetic
biography, “Attributing self-serving motives to those who
opposed him, he measured their purity against his own
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and found them wanting.” By 1856, he had abandoned the
collapsing Whig Party, allying with many of his former friends
and enemies by joining the Democratic Party.18
Before the switch, Reed was no Southern apologist like
most in the Philadelphia Democratic Party. In his biography
of his grandfather, Reed highlighted his grandfather’s support
for Pennsylvania’s 1780 gradual abolition law as a proud
accomplishment for his state.19 However, once he joined
the Democratic Party, Reed abandoned such praise. Reed
would reject congressional measures imposing limits on slave
ownership in the territories. He would also align himself with
a new home-state ally, the pro-Southern James Buchanan, for
his presidential campaign. Reed would help Buchanan bring
former Whigs like himself into the fold, portraying Buchanan
as a moderate who would “save the country from the fanatical
abolition which has always done wrong to us…”20 After
his victory, Buchanan would reward Reed by making him
Minister to China, a prestigious diplomatic post that solidified
Reed’s prominence and power within the city’s Democratic
establishment. Reed would serve in this position until returning
home in 1859 to defend Buchanan’s policies.
Thus, his 1861 speech was a homecoming for Reed,
and an opportunity for him to stake out an ideological vision
for the Philadelphia Democratic Party. He and the other
speakers, Reed claimed, were there to discuss “conciliation and
none other.” Lincoln’s election had unleashed a “fierce and
feverish spirit” that could only be prevented if the South was
placated. To appease the South, he urged the city’s Democrats
to adopt a course of neutrality to orchestrate a settlement
between those “whose fanaticism has precipitated this misery
upon us” and their “brethren in the South, whose wrongs we
feel as our own.”21 Though Reed did not directly advocate for
secession, his advocacy of neutrality and later support for the
Confederate cause over the Union cause led to that distinction
being forgotten in the years ahead. But at the time, his speech
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provoked relatively little controversy, as most city residents also
wanted conciliation.
Philadelphia was a city struggling with many competing
impulses in the years before the war. In many ways, it was
a Southern city on par with many below the Mason-Dixon
line. Its economy was closely allied with that of the South, its
political opinions, demonstrated by the overwhelming support
for Democratic candidates and positions, mirrored those of the
South, and its unfortunate attitudes and treatment towards its
black residents, mirrored the economic and social restrictions
free blacks faced in the South. At the same time, antipathy
began to develop against the Democratic Party, culminating
in the election of Alexander Henry as Mayor. Still, there was
no clear break, and Henry struggled throughout his first term
to politically coexist between Southern allies and the growing
Republican Party wanting stricter opposition. Henry also
struggled to utilize a new feature of his position, control of
the police. Furthermore, Democrats still held sway in the
city, as seen by the popular speech of William Reed. A break
would come, but it would take an event as catastrophic as the
attack on Fort Sumter for Henry and his allies to gain an edge
politically over their opponents and for Henry’s police-heavy
strategy to prove effective.
New York City was also greatly divided politically in
the lead up to the Civil War, and, like Philadelphia, residents
faced the question about how close to align their city to the
South. Wealthy New Yorkers, predominantly Democrats after
the collapse of the Whig Party, had a vested economic interest
in the South. New York City, more so than Philadelphia, was a
part of a global trading network, and the most common good
it unloaded in the decades before the war was Southern cotton.
Cotton, of course, required slaves, and as the price of slaves
skyrocketed, New York City banks extended credit to Southern
plantations in exchange for continued access to the cotton
market. Thus, New York City, as opposed to Philadelphia, was
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explicitly complicit in slavery.22 Plus, it was an open secret that
despite its nationwide ban in 1808, New York City continued
as a place to import slaves from Africa. In fact, a city newspaper
estimated in 1865 that between 1859 and 1860 alone, 85 ships
had arrived in New York from Africa.
The views of the city on slavery were not all on one
side of the debate though; in reality, New York City was on
two opposing tracks when it came to slavery. Slaves had been
officially manumitted in the city in 1827, a day that saw parades
throughout the city, though mostly with only black residents
participating. It also was home to prominent abolitionists,
like Lewis Tappan, who served as a part of the Underground
Railroad, and was the birthplace of the first black newspaper
in the United States, Freedom’s Journal. Yet even Tappan was a
major Northern trader of Southern cotton. Thus, while New
York City was likely, as one historian later called it, the North’s
most pro-South, anti-abolition city, it had an undercurrent of
dissent and contradictions that would be tested throughout the
Civil War.23
As part of a national party, New York Democrats were
also asked to swallow any misgivings they had about Southern
priorities like slavery and free trade because those in the North
could only win and influence national policy by courting and
winning in the Solid South.24 Thus began a divisive internal
party debate about how accommodating to be, and three
camps were formed. “Hards” were parrots of Southern rhetoric,
arguing the Union had to fully accommodate Southern
expansionist desires. “Softs” advocated for popular sovereignty,
a system devised by Illinois’ Stephen Douglas that allowed
territories to choose for themselves if they wanted to slavery.
Those who refused most or any accommodations with the
South or slavery were “Barnburners,” though most Barnburners
eventually fled to other parties or swallowed their misgivings
for the sake of electoral success and joined one of the other two
factions. While other state and local Democratic parties across
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the North combusted under the weight of the party’s divisive
policies of the 1850s, New York City’s was unique in that all
these cleavages would mostly last throughout the war, though
the factions took different names.25
Though he was not the cause of the divisions, perhaps
no one embodied these internal divisions better than Fernando
Wood. At the start of the war, Wood was a veteran New York
City politician in his third nonconsecutive term as mayor. He
was also a local, state, and national Democratic power broker
who tried to maintain influence as the city, and his party,
careened through crisis after crisis. All in all, the one constant of
Wood’s political power was that it was never constant. In part
this was because Wood had generally chosen no ideological side
in the great debate over accommodation to the South; he was
neither a Hard nor a Soft. In 1849 he allied with the Softs in
exchange for being the party’s nominee the next year, though
he lost because he refused to endorse the Compromise of 1850
as most other Softs did.26 When he finally won the mayoralty
in 1854, he quickly alienated his supporters within the party
with his patronage choices and public desire to be named Vice
President in 1856. After failing to achieve that position, Wood
had his term shortened by a year by Democrats to allow for
a new election as soon as possible, with the explicit goal of
replacing him.27
All this hostility resulted in Wood being voted out
of office in an 1857 landslide thanks to an unprecedented
fusion of the Know-Nothing and Republican parties with
the anti-Wood members of the Democratic Party behind one
candidate.28 This anti-Wood coalition was primarily composed
of members of Tammany Hall, the city’s Democratic machine
for much of the century. Wood nominally controlled the
machine during his two terms, but after his loss Tammany Hall
replaced one of Wood’s close allies, Gideon Tucker, as a sachem
and forced Wood out as Grand Sachem. Rather than try again
to regain control of the city’s existing Democratic organization,
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Wood decided to form his own political organization within
the Democratic Party. Wood had been somewhat of a political
kingmaker before by virtue of being Mayor, but most of his
efforts were futile. For instance, his attempts in 1855 to form an
alliance with Barnburner Democrats did not come to fruition
as both they and Tammany Hall were happy to have them leave
the party.29 Up until that point, even with the party’s internal
divisions, patronage, platforms, and candidates were almost
universally determined by unelected leaders of Tammany Hall
and not by elected officials like Wood.
But Wood sought, even in defeat, to make himself
the decider. He would form Mozart Hall in 1858 to directly
challenge Tammany Hall “until it opened its doors” to his
appointments.30 Wood’s first major success was not political,
but in print. He and his brother bought a failing newspaper
called the New York Daily News, and quickly turned it into a
well-read mouthpiece for Mozart Hall.31 Throughout this time
period, newspapers were often the chief mouthpiece for political
parties and actors to present their ideas and positions to voters,
to attack their opponents, and rally their supporters to their
side. As will be discussed later, this allowed newspaper editors to
possess a great deal of political leverage and wield great political
capital; but, the same held true for elected officials too. Wood
knew that a newspaper supporting Mozart Hall would greatly
increase his reach and impact in city politics. As a supporter
articulated in a letter shortly before the Woods bought the
New York Daily News, “What strikes you of the project? In
case of your approval I would undertake it at once & provide
the necessary materials & force - editorially & otherwise - to
make it worthy of democratic patronage & second to none
of its contemporaries in point of spirit…” For Wood and his
new backers, a newspaper was a crucial tool to regain their lost
influence.32
The problem for Wood, besides the trouble of trying to
supplant an organization with a history and tradition of success
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for decades, was that he had no ideological base of support.
Wood likely underestimated how his constant evolutions
had alienated most political allies and overestimated their
willingness to defect from Tammany too. For instance veteran
city naval leader Prosper Wetmore declined to ally with Wood
in the 1860 elections, saying the offer Wood proffered was
beneath his age and experience.33 Thus, Wood charted a new
path towards being a kingmaker: identity politics among the
city’s Irish. This was not the only strategy he employed though;
for instance, he had used John Brown’s Harpers Ferry raid
that year to great effect as supposed evidence of the dangers of
Republican rule.34
Wood had always pandered to the city’s Irish
community, somewhat ironic since he had joined a local
nativist group in an attempt to coalesce more support for his
1854 run.35 Although their poverty in Ireland and desire for
American prosperity may have led them towards Republican
free labor ideology, they resented Republican alliances with
nativists.36 Since the mass immigration of Irish began in the
1840s, the Democratic Party had been their political home.
But, after forming Mozart Hall, Wood would especially echo
their rhetoric. He was a vocal opponent of prohibition, seen by
many Irish immigrants at the time as a nativist talking point.37
He repeatedly denigrated his opposition as beholden to “British
stockjobbers,” a clear ploy for Anglophobic Irish sentiment.38
But perhaps most importantly, he played on Irish fears of
free black people as the Southerners did in Philadelphia and
throughout the North, convincing them of future economic
and social turmoil from greater black rights. Wood’s appeals
to the Irish would also serve to fill the ranks of leadership in
Mozart Hall since most of the defecting Tammany leaders, like
Charles Daly, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, were Irish
themselves.39
Tammany Hall made a concerted effort leading up to
the 1859 mayoral election to court Wood’s Irish base, promising
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them the share of patronage that had originally prompted Wood
to form Mozart Hall. But Tammany Hall was still an imperfect
messenger for Irish interests, choosing to nominate William
Havemeyer, a German businessman, over the Irish community’s
and Mozart Hall’s preferred candidate, William Kennedy, an
Irish merchant. Havemeyer, and his candidate for the city’s
Corporation Attorney, Samuel Tilden, called themselves “Fifth
Avenue Democrats” based on their residence within the city’s
upper economic echelon anchored at the city’s Fifth Avenue.
They saw their wealth and social presence within the city as an
asset, but most immigrants saw it as something else. Wood’s
mouthpiece, the New York Daily News, repeatedly referred to
Fifth Avenue Democrats “as a kid-glove, scented, silk stocking,
poodle-headed, degenerate aristocracy.” They were also accused
of not being Democrats, having supported the Free-Soil wing of
the party in the prior decade.40
Displeased with Tammany Hall’s decision, Wood
declared his candidacy, which he was not previously planning to
do. Originally running against the coalition that had defeated
him in 1857, his candidacy was aided by the Republican Party’s
decision to nominate their own candidate. Their nominee,
George Opdyke, hoped to appeal to independents and former
Democrats upset by the Party’s pro-Southern stances. However,
the Republicans were still too weak, and ended up siphoning
enough votes from Havemeyer that Wood would shock many
by winning the mayoralty again by a comfortable margin.
Disgusted, Tilden would blame the “ignorant Irish” for their
defeat, further driving the Irish away from Tammany Hall and
that faction’s increasingly wealthy shift.41 All of a sudden, Wood
was once again a power player in city party politics, and those
who once attacked him and kicked him out were now singing
his praises. A. Oakley Hall, a former Whig elected official and
a decade later a Tammany Hall-backed mayor, wrote Wood
that November to thank him for his “olive branch and to know
that you bear no malice for the certainly objectionable language
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displayed by me…which is now heartily withdrawn.”42
The topsy-turvy political odyssey of Fernando Wood
leading up to his surprising re-election as Mayor of New York
City is possibly the best encapsulation of how his political
power and ideals fluctuated. Wood’s primary goal, clearly, was
to acquire and maintain power. To do so, Wood had no qualms
about allying himself with different sides of the intraparty
feud that consumed Democrats in the 1840s and 1850s.
When he alienated too many allies in a quixotic bid for the
vice presidency and lost the mayoralty in 1857, Wood pressed
on, forming a rival Democratic faction to compete against
his long-standing benefactors. With this new faction, Mozart
Hall, Wood sought to encapsulate the pro-Southern ideology
within the Democratic Party and capture the Irish immigrant
demographic that was gaining more political influence every
year in the city. This electoral strategy proved successful,
demonstrating the popularity of his opinions and power of his
constituents; yet, it also represented severe miscalculations by
his old allies in Tammany Hall, their first of many in the years
of the Civil War.
But Wood wanted more than the political comeback he
had surprisingly achieved; he still wanted to be a national power
player. Defeated, Tammany Hall wanted their power back and
control of their city again. In pursuit of their feud, Wood and
Tammany Hall would foster great national conflict within the
Democratic Party at their party convention in 1860. In their
desires for party supremacy, they would refuse to compromise
on a presidential nominee, driving the Democratic Party into
geographic factions that ran two separate campaigns. United,
the Democratic Party may have won the 1860 presidential
election, especially since Lincoln was loathed by much of the
country; divided, they stood no chance against an emboldened
Republican Party. Therefore, while it may be too simple to say
the Tammany Hall-Mozart Hall feud was entirely responsible
for the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860, it
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unavoidably played a devastating role.
Wood was what his biographer Jerome Mushkat would
call New York City’s first “prototypical modern municipal
leader, a professional politician seeking to get, keep, maintain,
and expand power.”43 Already established as not content with
the mayoralty, as his predecessors were, he initially hoped to
be nominated for President at the 1860 Democratic National
Convention in Charleston, a long-shot bid quickly quashed
when the national party recognized Tammany Hall, not Mozart
Hall, as the New York Democratic delegation. Yet Wood
decided to travel to Charleston anyway, subsidizing the travel
expenses of his allies if they protested Mozart Hall’s exclusion.
Knowing that his Irish base had little national influence, Wood
focused more on highlighting his shared political interests
with the South. As previously established,Wood employed this
strategy in his 1859 mayoral campaign with success, and in
the leadup to the 1860 party convention he doubled down on
that strategy. His public letters with Virginia Governor Henry
Wise supporting his state’s execution of John Brown sought to
demonstrate his allegiance to the South and its political wishes,
and made him the Southern delegates’ favorite candidate for
Vice President, with many willing to lobby on his behalf. For
example, Fred Aiken, the secretary of the 1860 Democratic
convention and another Northerner with Southern sympathies,
pledged to “use my best ability to affect the public mind of
the South still more favorably in your behalf ” so Wood would
become Vice President.44
Wood now hoped to be nominated as Vice President
for John C. Breckinridge, President Buchanan’s sitting Vice
President, who Wood called “a live & ambitious man, with a
clear excellent & geographic status” to advance his candidacy.45
But Breckinridge, and his alliance with Southern “ultras,” best
known for their support for secession over the past decade,
made him anathema to much of the North. Tammany Hall
publicly backed Stephen Douglas, whose popular sovereignty
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was increasingly anathema to much of the South. Wood,
perhaps, could have helped convince his Southern allies to
support Douglas as their standard-bearer. However, Wood
refused, publicly calling Douglas the “bob-tailed pony from
Illinois.”46 Tammany Hall would not compromise either,
supporting a resolution to mandate two-thirds of the delegates
endorse the nominee. The goal of the resolution was to prevent
a Southern candidate from winning a simple majority without
any Northern support, but the plan backfired when Stephen
Douglas was unable to reach two-thirds as well.
After 57 failed ballots the convention was postponed,
and a second convention was called for Baltimore. An attempt
by Douglas to withdraw for a candidate capable of winning
Northern and Southern delegates when the Democrats met
again was rejected by Tammany Hall. With no hope of winning,
Breckinridge allies left the convention and nominated him
on a separate ticket, creating two rival Democratic campaigns
for the 1860 presidential election. Wood tried to work with
the two tickets to fuse in states where the Republicans would
win otherwise, but his efforts mostly failed. Lincoln would
be elected by a narrow plurality achieved by winning states
that Democrats, if united, would have otherwise won.47
While Wood’s more sympathetic biographer would wholly
blame Tammany, Wood’s other biographer, the generally
unsympathetic Samuel Pleasants, would wholly blame Wood.
This historiographical discrepancy shows how one’s view of
Wood clouds assigning blame for the Democratic debacle.48
Nevertheless, both sides of the New York Democratic divide
were principally responsible for the party’s split and loss because
they chose candidates that had no chance of winning and
refused to abandon them when this became clear.
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“The National Game. Three Outs and One Run.” Drawing depicting the four candidates of the 1860 United States presidential
election (L to R): John Bell, Stephen Douglas, John C. Breckinridge, and Abraham Lincoln.

Once Lincoln was elected, Wood faced new and
political challenges more dire than his fading national fortunes.
As mayor of New York City, his first major challenge in 1861
was deciding how to respond to the growing calls from his city’s
business community to forge some compromise to preserve
the Union and the city’s economic relationship with the South.
New York City’s business community was generally supportive
of Republican protectionist measures versus Democrat free
trade, but they worried that President Lincoln would stifle trade
with their biggest market, the South.49 Wood struggled to allay
their concerns; this tension would manifest most clearly before
the war in Fernando Wood’s infamous “Free City” speech. In
this speech, Wood advocated that New York City secede from
the state of New York and pledge neutrality in the inevitable
upcoming war between North and South. This speech would
share some similarities to William Reed’s previously discussed
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speech from the same winter. First, Wood argued that New
York City must stand “with our aggrieved brethren of the
slaves states” who they owe “friendly relations and common
sympathy.” Second, Wood argued that a free city status would
finally sever New York City from the wrongs of the state
leaders (who he claimed were more dangerous than Southern
secessionists) and attain security and prosperity. Finally, Wood
qualified his pronouncement, saying that no violence should be
utilized to help the city secede, but it should be done peacefully
once war began.50
What is most surprising about Wood’s speech is how
little notice it received at the moment. Partially this was the
result of few thinking a free city would be accomplished; in
fact, other than reported discussions with “certain wise men”
of the merchant community at Wood’s residence, no tangible
legislative or executive actions occurred.51 Yet this lack of
coverage may be due to a contemporary perception that the
speech was not as dubious as it appeared. Many biographers
of Wood, in fact, argue that his Free City speech was not
a controversial political manifesto, like Reed’s, but simply
either a “trial balloon” to see what rhetoric was permissible at
that unique moment of history or a simple continuation of
New York’s downstate-upstate feud.52 Feuds regarding “home
rule” for New York City, how much control the city should
have independent of state oversight, were constant. This
intrastate tension flared every time new taxes were debated
or new regulations were proposed, every time legislative
reapportionment was necessary, and especially every time that
political patronage was doled out. Wood’s three terms as mayor
were defined by a rivalry between New York City and the
rest of the state that, even today, often transcends party lines.
Therefore, Wood’s speech is often described as little more than
perhaps an ill-timed continuation of this conflict, and not an
accurate reflection of his ideological attitudes.
However, this argument is dubious since this would not
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be the end of Wood’s questionable actions and rhetoric towards
the South in the months before the war. His prior Thanksgiving
proclamation urged citizens to pray that Republicans stop
violating “the federal compact.”53 He issued a formal apology
in January to the Governor of Georgia when New York state
authorities found 25 muskets were heading south to aid the
rebellion.54 His brother even demanded “total acquiescence in
all Southern demands.”55 Some of Wood’s allies and base were
even secession apologists. At a December 15th meeting, some
Democrats passed a resolution extending “heartfelt sympathy”
to Southerners “engaged in the holy cause of American liberty
and trying to hold back the avalanche of Britishism…”56 It
seemed that Wood and his allies would be a constant thorn in
the side of Unionists until reconciliation was achieved.
As Wood ignited controversy and division, the city’s
Republican Party sought to resolve its own internal divisions.
For the decade before Wood’s controversial speech, parties in
opposition to the Democratic majority in New York City would
be too divided or controversial to reap the benefits of these
divisions. By 1860, what had originally been a loose union
of people united only by their opposition to Democrats was
now a formalized Republican Party, but like Democrats, the
Republicans had their own factions. The party was divided by
a debate about whether to lean more towards its Whig Party
roots or its Free-Soil Party roots. The former wanted a greater
focus on economic issues like tariffs or infrastructure, hallmarks
of the Whig ethos, and less on the South and slavery, the issues
that destroyed the Whig Party. The latter, some of whom were
once Democrats, wanted the focus on slavery and Southern
expansionism.
This divide was often correlated with newspaper
consumption. Whigs, who favored accommodation with KnowNothings and former Democrats, read Horace Greeley’s New
York Tribune. Those who wanted the party wholly Whiggish
read Henry Raymond’s New York Times. What saved these
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factions from destroying the national party as Democrats did
was that they all agreed to work for Abraham Lincoln’s election,
even though many had originally supported New York’s own,
William Seward, especially the Raymond faction. Lincoln
winning New York and defeating the Democratic candidates
nationwide was more important to both than settling intraparty
scores.57 That does not mean the Raymond faction was
happy; in fact, in a bitter New York Times article reflecting
on the convention, the paper referred to Lincoln’s backers as
“recusants” and thought so little of Lincoln that they referred to
him as “Abram Lincoln.”58
The rivalry between Raymond and Greeley was not just
ideological, it was also personal. Raymond used to work under
Greeley and for his New York Tribune but left after he became
fed up with Greeley’s public embrace of social experiments like
utopian socialism. Not only did he start his own competing
paper, the New York Times, but he stole more than a dozen
workers from Greeley, who for decades afterwards continuously
referred to Raymond as “the Little Villain.” For the next two
decades, their papers would bitterly compete for economic
supremacy in the city, with Greeley’s high-strung editorial style
and greater political radicalism keeping him ahead of Raymond
for much of that time. Politically, however, Greeley was less
successful against his nemesis. In 1854, both sought the Whig
nomination for the lieutenant governorship of New York, with
Raymond winning thanks to the backing of William Seward.
Greeley, of course, would get the last pre-war laugh against
Seward in that regard, though both Raymond and Greeley
continued to jockey, as we will see unsuccessfully, in the years
after.59
The secession crisis brought the schism back as both
party’s factions presented contrasting proposals for how to
proceed, making it all but impossible to wholeheartedly attack
Wood and his free city speech. Thurlow Weed, a close ally of
Seward and Raymond, proposed that secession be averted by
calling for a national convention that would constitutionally
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enshrine the Missouri Compromise and the Compromise
of 1850. While this proposal was seeming to limit some
westward extension, it would have led to the unstated result of
permanently protecting slavery in the Southern states.60 Horace
Greeley and his allies vehemently rejected Weed’s proposal,
saying that accommodation would delegitimize the entire
antislavery stand. Greeley asked all New York City Republican
Congressmen to go on record favoring “prompt and energetic
enforcement of all the laws of the general government” as the
way to ensure “the safety of the country” and “the preservation
of the Union.” Though they rejected Greeley’s proclamation,
none explicitly endorsed Weed’s proposals either.61 Once the
war began, it would become common for New York City
Republicans to paper over this resistance to aggression and their
support for some accommodations. Yet in due time, desires for
accommodation would return with a vengeance at the war’s
climax.
Clearly, in the years before the Civil War internal
disputes dominated both the Republican and Democratic
parties of New York City. It has already been established
that the Tammany Hall-Mozart Hall feud even had national
consequences, aiding in the election of Abraham Lincoln
and weakening the influence of Mayor Wood. His actions
after the election of Lincoln, especially his Free City speech,
caused further damage to his power. Though the clash between
Republican coalitions did not have the same negative national
consequences, in part because both sides went out of their way
to accommodate the nomination of Lincoln and work towards
his election, that does not mean the divide was any less severe.
Its Whiggish wing, embodied by Henry Raymond and the
New York Times and its Free Soiler wing, embodied by Horace
Greeley and the New York Tribune, disagreed mightily over
the direction the party should take regarding what issues to
prioritize, what policies to support, and what base of political
support they should cultivate.
Both Philadelphia and New York, already established as,
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despite their political diversity, broadly sympathetic to Southern
attitudes and positions,changed their rhetoric dramatically with
the attack on Fort Sumter April 12th, 1861. In Philadelphia,
excited crowds began peacefully roaming the streets to debate
the latest reports from the South and exclaim their glee at the
prospect of war. Quickly however, these gatherings became
more sinister in behavior. According to the Philadelphia Public
Ledger, originally an anti-slavery newspaper that under new
ownership became virulently pro-Confederate until it was
sold in 1864, “everyone who hinted any sympathy with the
secession was made to make an unequivocal stand.” Some, like
an intoxicated man who in a drunken stupor made the mistake
of declaring himself a Southern sympathizer, went unharmed
after leading “three cheers for the thirty United States.”62 After
a local newspaper published the names and addresses of several
wealthy Southerners, these crowds marched to their homes,
demanding shows of patriotism. When one of the Southerners,
Colonel Robert Patterson, refused, his windows were smashed.
Others deemed disloyal took refuge in the Court House or fled
to police protection. Those unable to flee in time were roughed
up, with reports of one man having his clothes ripped off and
another having his head put in a noose.63
To stem the growing violence, Mayor Henry put his
political fortunes on the line again with his use of his powers
over the city police. On April 15th, a pro-Union mob “swelled
to many hundreds” outside the office of a notoriously proSouthern newspaper, the Palmetto Flag, seeking more violence
against Southern sympathizers. Henry arrived with the chief
of police and the Reserve Corps to restore order. As the crowd
clamored for a speech, Henry deftly calmed the crowd with the
following:
Your devotion to the flag of your country satisfies me
that you are equally devoted to the maintenance of the
laws, and to the preservation of order. I see that there
are no traitors among you, and I rejoice to know that
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treason cannot rear its head in this city. The flag is
an emblem of the Government, and I hope that all
citizens who feel loyal to it will show their respect for
it and the laws and retire to their respective homes. 64
							

When the crowds dispersed but regathered the next day
at the home of the infamous William Reed, Henry went one
step farther to protect Southern allies. Reed of course was no
friend of Henry and those who supported the Peoples Party,
and afterwards Reed refused to thank the Mayor for his help.65
Yet in his remarks outside Reed’s home, Henry threatened the
crowd, ordering the police to shoot to kill to maintain order if
the crowd did not disperse. The next day, he issued an executive
proclamation asking residents to identify any persons suspected
of aiding the enemy. This order required “that all persons shall
refrain from assembly…unlawfully, riotously, or tumultuously,
warning them that the same will be at their peril.”66 For Henry,
order and loyalty were one and the same. Active secessionists
in his city and rioting anti-secessionists were both disloyal to
him, their city, and the new war effort. Rather than alienate
Unionists with his executive crackdown, Henry’s popularity
skyrocketed, and the city calmed. By April 18th, the streets
were clear and Union flags adorned the homes of those of all
political persuasions. While some Southerners left town, most
retreated into silence, knowing that they were outnumbered,
but protected if they kept quiet. 67
Philadelphia also decided to invest in its own military
protection, creating a Philadelphia Home Guard. Philadelphia’s
social elite worked with Mayor Henry to create a civil defense
force under his control that would be independent of the
city’s forces under the federal government which Lincoln
was beginning to deploy against the Confederacy. As the
founders of the Philadelphia Home Guard explained in a
public proclamation from April 19th, just one week after Fort
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Sumter, “those of our citizens whose ties prevent them from
undertaking active service, should lose no time in organizing
a ‘Home Guard’ to be in readiness to repel external aggression
and to maintain internal order.” They would go on to say
that the Home Guard would be created by the people: only
city residents, not the state or the federal government, would
be responsible for volunteering, training, finances, etc.68 The
founders included prominent members of the city’s social
and economic elite. For them, publicly, the Home Guard was
simply a way for those too old for active service or unable to
leave their businesses behind to help the war effort.

A depiction of the Volunteer Refreshment Saloon
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania during the American
Civil War.

However, the Home Guard would also have two ulterior
purposes that would serve the city and the Union war effort
more than the older gentlemen ever would have militarily in
case of an invasion. First and foremost, the Home Guard could
be an extension of the Mayor’s police forces. Henry Charles
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Lea intimated as much in a later private letter to Mayor Henry,
saying that with his support the Home Guard will “hold
themselves…to obey any orders you may give for service”
within the city.69 Henry had already demonstrated that he was
willing to use his police powers to maintain order in the city,
and that police presence was effective. Now, he would have
some of the city’s most recognizable and powerful leaders aiding
in that effort. Second, the Home Guard would be a tangible
mechanism for the city’s leaders, supportive of the Union
but skeptical about the war effort, to have their voices heard
and their impact felt. Many members of the Home Guard,
including Lea, were initially skeptical of Henry and his policies,
even publicly questioning his spending and infrastructure
priorities in 1860.70 As powerful businessmen, most had close
economic and social connections to the South, like their
aforementioned New York City counterparts, and would
therefore have some justification for neutrality towards the
war effort. Instead, the Home Guard prevented neutrality, and
would, until the creation of the Union League in the next year
, be the primary mechanism for helping them stay supportive
and loyal.
It is unmistakable that the coming of the Civil War
was a blessing for Mayor Henry’s political prospects. Though
Henry had originally hoped his term could avoid national
debates, the war undeniably strengthened his control over
Philadelphia and its politics. Before the war, he was severely
weakened, arguably only winning re-election because of voter
fraud. He had also proven unable to convince Philadelphia
voters that his political vision, a party between that of the
Democrats and Republicans, was a worthwhile course for the
city. Yet thanks to the war, Henry had a new political mandate.
His use of the police to foster order, reviled before the war, was
appreciated by both sides for preventing violence and mayhem.
Additionally, he worked diligently to foster political alliances
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with war supporters who may have disagreed with him on other
political issues. By inviting them into his coalition, perhaps best
embodied by the forming of the Home Guard, his new allies
had a vested interest in supporting his administration and his
policies. This support even extended once Henry started voicing
some more controversial opinions, granting Henry a veneer of
bipartisanship and moderation that would severely hamper his
opponents’ political efforts.
Residents and attitudes in New York City also saw a
sea change in sentiment after Fort Sumter. At a massive rally
on April 20th, an estimated 50,000 packed Union Square
for a public pro-war meeting carried out by a wide and
bipartisan group of the city’s political and economic leaders.
Organizers included all three mayoral candidates in 1859,
Havemeyer, Opdyke, and Wood, and the dueling Republican
newspapermen, Henry Raymond and Horace Greeley.
Tammany Hall would soon take their own actions, formally
adopting resolutions declaring they were “heartily united to
uphold the constitution, enforce the laws, maintain the Union,
defend the flag…the Union must and shall be preserved.”71 For
the most part, Tammany Hall would publicly remain strong
Unionists throughout the war, highlighting their views on the
war to deflect later charges of disloyalty from both parties.
In the battle of the presses, Horace Greeley gained an edge,
according to noted diarist George Templeton Strong, since “the
Greeley wing of Republicanism” was the chief driver of war in
the first place, leaving Raymond’s “conservative” wing looking
like a follower. Greeley’s harsh rhetoric towards the South
long before Fort Sumter was vindicated by the attack, while
Raymond’s moderation, plus his ally Seward’s desire for political
compromise, were now obsolete as the nation sought revenge
against the “‘chivalric’ bullies and braggarts” of the South.72
Even Fernando Wood was swept up in the patriotic
fervor. On April 15th, he issued a proclamation summoning
citizens “irrespective of all other considerations and prejudices”
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to obey the law, preserve order, and protect property. Attending
the city’s first “Union Rally” the next day, he literally draped
himself with the American flag while exhorting “every man,
whatever had been his sympathies, to make one great phalanx
in this controversy, to proceed to conquer a peace. I am with
you in this contest. We have no party now.” He made similar
remarks at the rally on the 20th and proposed a special milliondollar tax to support the war effort and create a “Mozart
Regiment” under his command.73 To some, this sudden
transformation was clearly a sham and a political ploy, with one
unnamed critic growling “The cunning scoundrel sees which
way the cat is jumping, and put himself right on the record in
a vague, general way, giving the least offense to his allies of the
Southern Democracy.” Wood, perhaps indicating this hedging,
argued in that same flag-draped speech that whether the Union
would be reunited “by fratricidal warfare or by concession,
conciliation, and sacrifice” was still unanswered.74
Regardless, Wood clearly hoped that his party and his
base, like he was publicly trying to do, could support the war
without having to support all of Lincoln’s policies. He also
hoped they could do so within the new demands of loyalty
to the Union. Yet, voices remained within the Democratic
Party that rejected the entire legitimacy of the war and any
bipartisan accommodations with it or Lincoln. Wood’s brother,
Benjamin, was perhaps the loudest of these voices. Benjamin
Wood directly opposed his brother’s transformation, using the
Daily News, of which he was now the sole editor due to his
brother’s re-election, to scold Mozart Hall’s war platform, and
maintaining that only “friends of Peace’’ were true Democrats.75
In this battle between the Woods, the publisher would beat the
politician. Mozart Hall formally endorsed Benjamin Wood’s
sentiments, though they would agree to work with Tammany
Hall on nominating a united slate in the fall elections if
possible. This defeat by his own organization would send a
chilling message for Fernando Wood about straying from his
Penn History Review

43

Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban America

new political base, a message he would long remember going
forward.
The fact that such a vocal minority of Southern
sympathizers persisted surely damaged New York City’s overall
loyalty to the war effort. Yet perhaps most significantly, New
York City would not have a similar institution or organization
as effective as Philadelphia’s Home Guard. A bipartisan Union
Defense Committee, of which Fernando Wood was initially
an ex-officio member and active participant, was formed
shortly after Fort Sumter by the city Chamber of Commerce.
Their stated goal was to serve “in aid of the Government in
the present crisis, to accelerate and facilitate the organization
of forces, the transportation of troops and provisions, and the
cooperation of popular action in all loyal parts of the country.”76
But, its impact and the creation of a Union Party in September
1861 were only successful primarily upstate.77 Tammany Hall,
despite agreeing with most of Lincoln’s war policies before
emancipation, also never publicly considered allying with the
city’s Republican Party.
Therefore, there was no formal infrastructure or alliance
in place for much of the war to ensure that the city’s elite
who were generally supportive of the war, but not of Lincoln
and some of his policies, had buy-in to the war effort. There
was nothing to ensure their loyalty and continued support.
In those crucial early days, a bipartisan consensus like that of
Philadelphia could have been achieved, but it was not. Wood
also refused to use his executive authority in the same way as
Henry did to silence dissent and maintain order. For instance, a
June editorial by his brother claimed that Northerners had been
tricked into supporting the war effort, and now they had to
turn against the war and ensure conciliation.78
Under Wood’s leadership in 1861, not only would the
Democratic Party not unite in its role as “the loyal opposition,”
but its anti-war voices were as loud, powerful, and effective at
rallying their base as ever. It was at this point that New York
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City and Philadelphia both began to irrevocably diverge on
their journey through the war. Philadelphia came out of the
first few months more united and peaceful than before, while
New York City remained as divided as ever, if not more than
before. The blame for the continued divisiveness of New York
City politics is not solely Wood’s, but he played a crucial role.
Though he had publicly backed much of the pro-war zeal that
engulfed the city after the attack on Fort Sumter, he privately
capitulated to his anti-war backers, especially his own brother.
Furthermore, unlike his counterpart in Philadelphia, he did
not seek to foster bipartisan loyalty to the war effort or allow
his political coalition to grow with pro-war voices. By and large
and in part thanks to Wood, New York City’s political situation
looked little different in the fall of 1861 than it did in the
winter of 1861.
New York City, additionally, had a crucial and divisive
mayoral election to endure that year, another reason for its
continued political divisions. The fact that Philadelphia had no
major elections in the fall of 1861 is another major reason why
it remained peaceful and united. Other than a congressional
special election won by a Democrat, Charles Biddle, there
were few opportunities for partisan electoral conflict that
could break the bipartisanship. This gave Henry time and
resources to realize his mayoral vision and find common
ground with allies and enemies. He could show the people of
Philadelphia why they wanted his moderate Unionism and
strong police power. Additionally, without major elections,
the city’s Democrats had few opportunities to advance its
bench of potential elected officials. Thus, the Democratic Party
continued to highlight politicians of yesteryear, like William
Reed. Without constituents to serve, and thus their sentiments
to consider, these party elders even championed recognition of
the Confederacy as an independent nation.79 As Philadelphians
were beginning to send their sons and fathers off the war,
these aging politicians seemed out-of-touch and elitist at best,
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treasonous at worst. In response, city residents painted the
entire city’s Democrats with a broad disloyal stroke that many
Democrats sought to soften by allying with Henry. It would
take another year for Philadelphia Democrats to elect new
leaders, but by then they were more focused on national issues
like emancipation and national forums like Congress, leaving
the bipartisan leadership of the city and alliances with Henry
intact.
As for New York City, Fernando Wood entered his reelection campaign in a precarious position. His “conversion”
to Unionism caused distrust and defections from Mozart
Hall without gaining him new allies. While his opponents
once again refused a coalition, both Tammany Hall and the
Republican Party were emboldened by the popularity of the
war, and both called for its vigorous execution. Tammany Hall
even declared at their state convention “the first and most
sacred duty of every man” is to “devote his energies and his
means, with all his heart and soul, to the earnest and resistless
prosecution of the war, until the rebellion is utterly suppressed.”
Furthermore, President Lincoln “is imperatively required...to
take every step...which may be necessary to secure the triumph
of our arms...and that his measures will be passed upon by a
generous and patriotic people...without party spirit.”80 Boldly,
every Tammany candidate statewide publicly endorsed these
sentiments.81 Tammany Hall was also emboldened by a new
interparty consensus. Unlike in 1859 when campaign attacks
were primarily directed at Havemeyer and Opdyke, Tammany
Hall and the GOP reached an unofficial détente, training their
fire solely on Wood, his views on the war, and his policies.82
Wood’s chances were further diminished when he was
credibly accused of corruptly doling out city contracts to close
allies, while also using city finances for electioneering and
public election funds for personal gain.83 Severely weakened,
Wood went to two tried and true methods when a political
position may be popular, but the candidate is not. First, and
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more successfully, he publicly decried his investigations as
politically motivated. He zeroed in on accusations that the
city’s Corporation Attorney investigated him to advance
his candidacy for District Attorney, forcing him to publicly
renounce his candidacy.84 Second, he nationalized his race. On
November 29th, a week before Election Day, Wood changed
the tenor of his campaign and his ultimate political destiny
with a speech at Volks Garten. Casting off any prior support
for the war effort, Wood charged the Lincoln administration
with the intention of prolonging the war “as long as there is
a dollar to be stolen from the National Treasury or a drop of
Southern blood to be shed.” He also charged Lincoln and the
Republican Party with being in favor of abolition so free black
workers could compete with poor white laborers. To Wood,
the Republican Party hoped for the destruction of immigrants,
especially his base, since “They will get the Irishmen and
Germans to fill up the regiments and go forth to defend the
country…they will themselves remain at home to divide the
plunder.”85
In this speech, Wood publicly relitigated his favorite
political talking points, especially support for the South and for
immigrants, specifically Irish and German. Yet privately, Wood
refused to wholly denounce his prior Unionism. In a curious
development, the same day that he gave his Volks Garten
speech he also fired off a defensive letter to Secretary of State
and fellow New Yorker William Seward. Despite what others
were saying about him, he was “for a vigorous prosecution of
the war, for sustaining the administration by every power at
our command and for the restoration of peace only if it can be
done consistently with the safety, honor, and unity of the entire
government.”86 Even with a Republican in the race, Wood
claimed that he deserved their support for his campaign since
he best articulated Unionist ideals.
There are two possible reasons for this letter. One
is that Wood sincerely believed that, despite his history of
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controversial comments, including his speech that very day, he
was loyal to the Union and deserving of Lincoln’s support. That
idea prompts another question, why this or the fairly pleasant
reply from Seward’s son thanking Wood for his support for
the Union, were not released to the public, which could have
swayed enough skeptics to re-embrace him? Thus, the second
reason is most likely: Wood was simply a shrewd politician,
cynically hoping to utilize the Lincoln administration and
its vast political resources, or at least keep them from being
used against him. The fact that no evidence exists of Lincoln
or Seward publicly bashing Wood during the campaign or
diverting energy to helping elect the Republican indicates that
Wood’s letter may have been effective. For example, Seward
did not respond to entreaties from the New York Metropolitan
Police, a force under state Republican control, to arrest Wood
for the content of his speech.87 Furthermore, Thurlow Weed
had privately requested a meeting with Wood the month before
“if it would not make too much talk,” perhaps to discuss the
race, though no record exists of if the meeting occurred.88
However, the lack of effort may also indicate that the
Lincoln administration had little confidence a Republican
could be elected as Mayor of New York City; and, there was
good reason to assume this. The Republicans had once again
nominated George Opdyke. A wealthy clothing manufacturer,
his primary pre-war income came from selling clothes to
slaves down South, and his Whiggish politics inspired few
allies. He did gain some Republican approval after his 1859
loss for working with loyal businessmen during the secession
crisis to prevent the city’s businessmen from committing “a
compromise of principle” to assuage the South.89 But, as a
vocal Republican, he faced constant labeling by Democrats as a
“black Republican” hoping to emancipate blacks and subjugate
whites.90 Like Wood, he was also perceived as a politician
first, civic leader second. George Templeton Strong, though a
Republican, nonetheless described him as a “pushing, intriguing
48

Justin Greenman

Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban America

man, fond of power and position.”91
The enigma in the race was the Tammany Hall
candidate, Charles Godfrey Gunther. Like Opdyke, he was
a rich merchant. Thus, many assumed he would be closer in
policy outlook and personality to the Fifth Avenue Democrats.
However, Gunther was a prominent German activist and
organizer. Though Wood was primarily concerned with the
Irish, German immigrants made up a prominent part of his
anti-war coalition, so it was assumed that Gunther could bring
parts of Mozart Hall’s base back into Tammany Hall. As for
Gunther’s appeal to pro-war Democrats, that was less clear.
Civil War historian Ernest McKay claims that despite being a
member of Tammany Hall, the “War Democrats,” on specific
war policies Gunther differed little from the Woods.92 Thus,
he too inspired little confidence amongst New Yorkers. In the
end, many New Yorkers cared little about which anti-Wood
faction won, so long as Wood was gone. As New York political
historian Sidney Brummer put it, in the minds of many critics
of Wood and his policies, “Whether to vote for Opdyke or
for Gunther, was with many simply a question of which had a
better chance of defeating Wood.”93
Election Day finally came on December 3rd, 1861,
and few intimated to guess who would win. Each candidates’
headquarters were packed well into the morning. Through the
night, each group alternated between pessimism and optimism.
As a potentially foreboding sign, when Opdyke arrived at his
headquarters early the next morning, someone gave off an alarm
that the floor was collapsing. Panic ensued, with some suffering
bruises and torn clothes.94 Early returns indicated a Gunther
victory, but by ten a.m. Opdyke was declared the winner with
little more than six hundred votes over Gunther and 1200 over
Wood. Opdyke won nine of the city’s wards, mostly dominated
by Republicans, but he also embarrassingly won Wood’s home
ward by one percent and did especially well in wards populated
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by former Know Nothings. Gunther, as expected, won the four
German wards from Wood, but did not win all of the Irish
wards, splitting them with Wood costing Tammany Hall the
race.95 Without the Democratic split, especially over immigrant
votes, it is safe to assume either Wood or Gunther would have
easily won, but with the split New York City had just had
its closest three-way race ever and elected its first Republican
mayor. In what must have been an awkward transition, Wood
and Opdyke civilly exchanged letters and agreed to meet at
some point in December.96
Perhaps real change could be imparted on the city’s
policies and its relationships with the war effort and Albany.
Some Republicans were optimistic, with Henry Bellows
regarding Opdyke’s election as “an augury of national
strength.”97 Some, like Strong, while happy that Wood lost, saw
Opdyke as little more than the lesser of evils.98 But most were
worried. Even with a Republican mayor, the Republicans who
controlled Albany were unlikely to grant more power to the
city, most remaining appointed and elected municipal officials
were Tammany or Mozart allies, and there was still a hotbed
of anti-war, anti-black, anti-Lincoln newspapers and activism
throughout the city. To say that Opdyke’s tenure would be
divisive and contested would be an understatement, though
what happened would likely have been more tumultuous
than most would have anticipated.99 If 1861 was a year for
Republican gains and Democratic divisions, in both cities, then
1862 and 1863 would show the power Democrats could yield
if they united, but also the dangers that unity posed and how
fragile it would be.
This work has sought to compare and contrast New
York City and Philadelphia politics by looking at how the
cities, in similar positions demographically, politically, and
socially before the war, reacted to the conflict. The primary
framework for doing so has been examining how political
actors in both cities, from elected officials and party leaders to
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everyday voters, defined loyalty and disloyalty during an event
so all-encompassing and divisive. It is without a doubt that
in both cities, despite their differences by the end of the war,
some of the same definitions were utilized. Additionally, some
of the same ideological arguments were made in both cities,
often by members of the same political party. Both cities also
endured intraparty feuds that ensured that claims of loyalty
and disloyalty were not just lobbed at partisan opponents, but
intraparty ones as well. In writing on Philadelphia during the
American Civil War period, one hundred years later, historian
William Dusinberre framed Philadelphia as a city that entered
the conflict weak and bitter. The city was “fiercely jealous
of New York,” but also of other cities like Boston and New
Orleans that had usurped its national and global economic
output. Its only reliable trading partner was the South, and they
were now leaving the Union. For decades, it had struggled to
integrate its ethnically and racially diverse inhabitants into the
city. These internal tensions led to nativist riots in the 1840s
and a black population, the largest in the North, with few
economic or social opportunities. It also had a fragile municipal
government led by a weak mayor, even after it consolidated
with its outlying counties in 1854. All in all, there were many
reasons why many Philadelphia residents had an inferiority
complex towards their Northern neighbors.100
The central question of this paper, therefore, has been
why did Philadelphia and New York City diverge so sharply
and if and how did conceptions of loyalty and disloyalty play
a role? Philadelphia’s success at avoiding much of the turmoil
that befell New York City was due to the leadership of its
wartime mayor, Alexander Henry. First and foremost, Henry
took what was once considered a weakness of the municipal
government of Philadelphia, that as mayor his primary means
of influence was control over the police, and turned it into
a positive. Philadelphia easily could have descended into the
divisiveness and bloodshed of its northern neighbor, and nearly
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did because it too possessed a loud and somewhat popular antiwar faction. But it did not, largely because Henry repeatedly,
fairly, and unequivocally utilized his police powers to maintain
order.101 He also ruled in a bipartisan manner, avoiding many
of the contentious and divisive issues of the day. His party,
first known as the People’s Party and then the Union Party,
allowed members of different political persuasions to feel
included and heard in city governance as elected officials,
members of the Home Guard, and in unofficial capacities. At
times, especially immediately before Fort Sumter, both of these
political values made Henry unpopular with both sides, but as
the war progressed his deft handling of the city granted him
easy electoral success because more Philadelphians than not
were invested in the well-being of their city. It is no wonder
then that Dusinberre, writing a century after Henry retired in
January of 1866 (mayoral terms had been extended to three
years during his reign and elections moved to the fall), declared
that “Alexander Henry’s conduct of the police force from
1858 to 1865 in itself shows him to have been the best mayor
Philadelphia ever had.”102
To conclude, this examination of the years 1859-1861
promised no easy answers about the types of definitions of
loyalty and disloyalty employed during the Civil War, nor about
the reasons why each city ended up on the trajectory it did. As
I stated earlier, throughout the war there was no simple answer
about what loyalty and disloyalty meant, and therefore there
is no simple reason for the fates of the actors and groups from
Philadelphia and New York City that have been discussed.
In the end, we must recognize that even if we treat the years
around the Civil War as being on some clear arc destined to
bend in a certain direction, there will always be bumps and
always be outliers. All historians and readers of the era can do
is try to pull back the curtain of time, reevaluate long standing
historical assumptions, increase the prominence of forgotten
leaders and groups of people, and try to understand it all to the
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best we can, as I have sought to do in this thesis.
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American railroad accounting practices in the mid-nineteenth century
William Zimmermann
Introduction
The nineteenth century was a significant time for the
United States and for American business. The United States
emerged as a world power in this century, evolving from a fledgling coastal state into a continental giant. Much of this geopolitical expansion was fueled through the rapid growth of the
American economy. In order to understand how the American
economy was transformed, it is first helpful to understand how
American business was transformed. This research paper seeks
to answer this question by analyzing the accounting practices
of railroads in the mid-nineteenth century. Accounting is the
language of business and can be used to analyze the dynamics
of mid-nineteenth century business. Contemporarily, managers,
investors, and regulators use accounting-based financial reports
to try to better understand a firm’s operations and economic
situation. Therefore, financial reports and commentary on them
from the period will yield critical knowledge on how different
economic agents (managers, investors, creditors, regulators, and
others) interacted and communicated with each other in the
adolescent phase of both American capitalism and corporate
culture.
The railroad industry was chosen because it was the
most significant industry of the mid-nineteenth century and
perhaps the most significant industry of the whole period.
Railroads were the first to adopt a corporate business organization that would later mature to the corporate organization
recognizable today. The reason the railroad industry adopted
large corporate structures was its need to raise large amounts of
capital. Railroads needed to construct and maintain hundreds
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of miles of track, purchase expensive engines, and build stations
to operate the tracks. Railroad managers turned to the public to
find both investors and creditors in order to afford the massive
initial costs required to start railroad. Since the investors were
the actual owners of the railroad, managers needed to integrate
investors into the administration of the firm. This was done almost exclusively through forming a corporation, with investors
electing a board of directors to appoint managers. The number
of investors and size of railroads made them massive organizations, and the capital needs and scope of railroads led to further
development of the corporate form of business organization. A
critically important feature of the American economy’s growth
in the nineteenth century was the maturation and widespread
adoption of corporations in the United States. Since railroads
were the most influential corporations of the mid-nineteenth
century, it is logical to focus on them to understand the wider
economy. Finally, focusing on the mid-nineteenth century will
be insightful because it was the period where annual reports
became truly sophisticated while also remaining unstandardized
by national legislation. Railroads weren’t universally regulated
by the federal government until the passage of the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887 and annual reports weren’t standardized
until 1906 with the passage of the Hepburn Act, although the
federal government did have some reporting requirements for
railroads that received federal money. Instead, individual states
had a wide variety of regulations and requirements for financial
reporting. Since an important theme of the nineteenth-century
American economy was the early development of modern business, understanding how firms acted without strict guidelines or
standards will be especially valuable.
Financial reporting developed significantly in this period, prompted by the demands of corporations such as railroads.
While financial information had been considered proprietary
during most of the First Industrial Revolution, it was necessary
for railroads to report this information publicly to their owners
Penn History Review
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– the shareholders. This rapid development in the sophistication
of financial reporting was driven both by the legal requirements
of the federal and state governments and by the demands of
investors. During this period, the novelty of financial reporting
and the lack of standardization meant that managers were able
to experiment greatly with how reports were made. Occasionally, this allowed unscrupulous managers to create misleading or
fraudulent reports. For the most part, however, financial reports
of this period were impressively informative and enlightening.
Accounting theory also reached high levels of sophistication,
although it was inhibited by a lack of standardization. This
lack of standardization incentivized managers to choose the accounting methods that reflected well on the firm over methods
that reflected the real economic situation. Much like today,
financial reports were primarily focused on the status of the
company and its profitability. Annual reports usually contained
only information on the balance sheet and income statement.
Since railroads usually used a cash basis, the income statement
somewhat mirrored the cash flows from operating activities,
which could be used to evaluate the firm’s ability to pay debt
and distribute dividends. Managers also used accounting to better understand their operations and gather detailed statistical
summaries. Similar to how investors used accounting to evaluate a firm, managers often used these figures to aid in strategic
decision making. Overall, railroad accounting in this period was
impressively sophisticated.
Federal and State Requirements for Financial Reports
In contemporary America, anyone familiar with business has some familiarity with a Form 10-K. In the United
States and most modern economies, financial reporting for
public companies is a strictly regulated and standardized practice. Governments and standard setting authorities have created
detailed methods on how a firm should assemble and present
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its books to regulators and investors. Beyond government authorities, groups like the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB) have created detailed rules on how to prepare financial
statements. These rules, US GAAP from FASB and IFRS from
IASB, have been made by regulators to be the standard method
for accounting in public companies. However ubiquitous now,
this state of affairs should not be taken for granted. Rigorous
and detailed accounting standards did not exist in the midnineteenth century.
Since their inception, railroads have been closely connected to the federal and state governments. The federal and
state governments were very interested in the development and
success of railroad companies, because populating and connecting America’s quickly expanding territory required an extensive
infrastructural network. Furthermore, at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, a state charter was usually required or desired for incorporation, so most railroads wanted some level of
state recognition. Therefore, both the federal and state governments were very involved in the establishment and funding of
railroads; meanwhile, other investors welcomed government
participation as a means to receive a favorable charter and continued state support. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, or ‘the
B&O,’ provides an excellent example of how this close relationship between state governments and railroads was reflected in
railroad accounting. When the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, or
the B&O, was created, “civic pride rather than profits made the
B&O from its origin a ‘community enterprise’.”1 Beyond civic
pride, the B&O almost functioned as a state company and “in
granting the charter for incorporating the B&O, the Maryland
legislature retained the authority to set rates… [and] exempted
the railroad from tax.”2 The railroad’s charter played a very significant role in developing financial reporting in railroads and
beyond. When B&O was incorporated, “the B&O Charter…
required that stockholders be issued an annual ‘Statement
Penn History Review
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of Affairs.’”3 However, that was the limit of the detail in the
statutory requirement. Impressively, this ‘Statement of Affairs’
evolved from “a five-page letter from the president to the investors” in 1827 into an impressively sophisticated annual report
that included “the first modern example of a private corporation reporting revenues and expenses to stockholders” in 1832.4
Therefore, the business environment in which railroads developed not only legally required some form of financial reporting,
but also encouraged the development of sophisticated accounting and reports.
The federal government also fostered the development
of financial reporting through statutes and requirements. Similar to the states, the widespread and generous use of federal
funds in supplying capital to railroads prompted the federal
government to legally require railroads to provide vital information regarding their operations and status. In 1862, Congress
passed the renowned Pacific Railroad Act, which enabled the
Treasury to issue bonds to railroads for the construction of a
transcontinental railroad. In Section 20 of the legislation, the
government required railroads to
[submit to] the Secretary of the Treasury an annual report
wherein shall be … First. The names of the stockholders… Second. The names and residences of the directors… Third. The amount of stock subscribed, and the
amount thereof actually paid in… Fourth. A description
of the lines of road surveyed, of the lines thereof fixed
upon for the construction of the road, and the cost of
such surveys ; Fifth. The amount received from passengers on the road ; Sixth. The amount received for freight
thereon ; Seventh. A statement of the expense of said road
and its fixtures ; Eighth. A statement of the indebtedness 5
							
of said company, setting forth the various kinds thereof.

The complex and detailed requirements of this legislation demonstrates that the annual reports were, indeed, becoming more and more sophisticated. Further, the evolution of
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the required information from the annual reports of the B&O
charter to the requirements here reveals that governments were
becoming more exacting in the reports they received, acting
as both investors and regulators. Outlined in the legislation,
regulators were requiring the railroads to report on their capital
structure, their revenue and expenses, and the current lines they
were developing or operating.
By 20 years later, railroads had already become the
largest business in the world. Pursuant to statutory reporting
requirements, the Auditor of Railroad Accounts sent the Secretary of the Interior an annual report containing information
on all railroads that had received some form of federal aid. This
report contained vital information on what financial reports really consisted of in the mid-nineteenth century. In Appendix E
of the report, there were three forms the railroads were required
to submit. These were Form No. 8-001, essentially the balance
sheet, Form No. 8-002, a report on the financial and statistical status of the railroad, and Form No. 8-003, essentially the
income statement.6 Remarkably, annual reports had evolved in
the span of just a few decades from brief letters to complex logs
analogous with modern reports. Contained in the 1880 Annual
Report of the Auditor of Railroad Accounts, many railroads’
financials were displayed in such a way that even modern readers can have some grasp of their business’ operations and status.
That ability is the power of financial reports.
Both the federal and state governments mandated the
creation of financial reports for several reasons. Governments’
financial stakes in many railroads is an obvious reason. Much
like other shareholders, governments hoped to ensure that
their investments, grants, or other forms of aid were being used
wisely by management to promote the development and success
of the firm. Another reason for governments to observe railroads’ businesses through financial reporting was due to the use
of railroads as a quasi-state agency. As previously discussed, the
government often had the authority to decide the rates railroads
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could charge or limit the profit margins of a firm. This was
done purposefully because governments saw the railroad as a
means of promoting commerce and economic activity in the region. This was the tradeoff that firms faced when they accepted
governmental investments. The state vigorously promoted the
expansion of railroads but did this in order to pursue additional
economic and political objectives. Managers, who were content
with receiving government aid, also had to accept this level of
oversight.
The development of financial reports is an important
piece of evidence in revealing this relationship. This is a very
significant observation about the origins of American corporations. The government participated in an intimate way with
the creation and funding of the first American corporations.
This differs greatly from the free-market ideology or politics associated with American corporate culture today. Early railroads
were often created and incorporated by legislatures and later
railroads received significant funding from the federal and state
governments in order to achieve government goals, which were
partially aligned with private investors. Therefore, from its beginning financial reporting was not only just a method to remedy information asymmetries between managers and investors
but was also a mechanism allowing the government to watch
over and control industries it identified as nationally significant.
Management – Goals and Uses for Financial Reports
Although the practice of reporting was required under
legal statutes, managers had a great deal of flexibility in how
they created their annual reports, as comprehensive industry
standards like US GAAP or IFRS had yet to be introduced.
Since managers had such a high degree of agency over their
reports, studying the various reporting methods used by managers can reveal their differentiated prerogatives with financial
reporting. Managers had to report the status of the business to
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regulators and investors, but they were often at the liberty of adjusting their accounting methods to make their firm look more
attractive. Perhaps most interestingly, it seems that managers
also used the creation of annual reports and detailed accounting
to inform themselves about their firm’s financial situation. In a
time before the internet and data science, managers could often
be unaware of many of the details of the railroad’s operations.
Therefore, managers often created detailed microeconomic
analyses of their business while making their financials. Much
like investors, managers were able to use detailed information
on their earnings and operations for strategic decision making.
Early railroad managers’ chief difficulty in creating annual reports lies in the lack of precedents in business. Unlike
contemporary CEO’s and CFO’s, they were never exposed to
a Form 10-K in a business school class. Instead, many railroad
executives chose to mimic existing firms’ annual reports. Since
the B&O was the oldest railroad in the United States, it “was
known as ‘the B&O University’ and its annual reports were
viewed as textbooks about railroading, and engineering and
financial developments disclosed were closely followed by other
railroads.”7 Again, the influence of regulators can be seen, for
the Maryland legislature’s reporting requirements impacted the
practices of railroads far outside of the state. This mimicking
highlights that while there was great variety in annual reporting,
managers were not operating in a bubble and industry standards
did exist within a range of acceptability.
The formal arrangement of three primary statements
(the balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash
flows) did not yet exist but reports generally contained substantial information for all three categories. Firms seem to have
almost universally presented a balance sheet (listing assets, liabilities, and stockholders’ equity) and an income statement
with revenues and expenses. The combination of the balance
sheet and income statement captured some of the information
typically found in a statement of cash flows since “initially most
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railroad accounting records were kept on a cash basis.”8 The
primary focus of managers seems to have been reporting and
analyzing their revenues and expenses. Similar to contemporary
managerial focuses on ‘free cash flow’ and EBITDA, railroad
managers of the mid-nineteenth century were deeply interested
in their ability to generate cash to fund expansions and pay
dividends and “as a result their reports primarily dealt with the
sources and disposition of cash and with statistical measure of
the flow of traffic.”9 How firms measured their revenues and
expenses, which was an approximation of cash flow, had significant implications for their reported profitability. All of these
reports together (the balance sheet, income statement, and statistical analysis) gave both managers and investors an incredible
view into the operations and health of the railroad.
The creation of annual reports led to many challenges
for accountants, because they often had to develop accounting theory ad hoc. One of the major challenges of this sort for
railroads was accounting for long-lived fixed assets. Valuing the
many miles of railroad tracks was difficult for accountants, but
critically important for managers, since a huge portion of the
total assets of a railroad were in fixed assets like tracks. Even
contemporarily, there are many methods of accounting for
long-lived assets and reporting methods in the United States
that don’t match with the methods employed by taxing authorities. US GAAP allows for straight-line depreciation, sum-of-theyear’s-digits, and several other methods. Meanwhile, the IRS
uses a system called MACRS.
Going back over a century, managers had even less precedent or theory to work with. As explained by James Boockhodlt, there were several popular methods, each with their own
pros and cons. It bears to keep in mind that despite the relative
youth of annual reporting, some of these methods were surprisingly sophisticated and resemble modern accounting standards.
Three quasi-popular methods included: “periodic revaluation,”
which was similar to mark-to-market valuation with pretty
67

William Zimmermann

American Railroad Accounting Practices

frequent upward adjustments; an annuity method, which paid
the annuity in order to create a future fund to pay for the replacement of the assets; finally, there was the ‘renewal method,’
which was similar to accumulated depreciation and expensed
the decline of an assets value over time.10 All of these methods
had advantages and disadvantages, but they achieved something
significant: expensing the costs of capitalized assets. Overall, the
development of these methods was evidence of the impressive
improvements in accounting theory during this period. Admittedly, mid-nineteenth century managers had a level of discretion
over the creation of their reports that today would be deeply
unsettling. Despite that, some managers and railroads did produce high quality reports that attempted to give investors a
pretty objective view of their property.
However, some managers were not as noble because
these expenses could have such a major impact on the bottom
line of a railroad. Many wanted to be slyer in their expensing
of capital assets and, in the absence of strict accounting standards, they could get away with what is today euphemistically
called “creative accounting”. While some of the methods tried
to periodically expense some part of their capital assets, most
firms used “the retirement method of accounting for fixed assets… under this method, the expense due to the exhaustion of
property was recognized at the time of the retirement of a unit
of the property.”11 This method ultimately replaced the other
three as the most popular among managers. The justification for
this method was that “as long as the property was maintained
in good repair then no decrease in the value of the asset had
occurred.” In contemporary business, this accounting theory
would not be accepted. Depreciation has man12y definitions,
but economic depreciation is usually characterized as the decline in the future benefits (or cash flows) from the asset due to
its use that year. These assets had a limited lifespan and would
eventually need to be replaced, regardless of what amount of
repair the railroad companies conducted on tracks, engines,
Penn History Review
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and other capital equipment. Therefore, firms should have accounted for this decline with some sort of record of the implied
expense. For shareholders, this was really dubious accounting;
the intrinsic value of their equity was the net of assets and liabilities. With the retirement method, a railroad track would be
worth its capitalized costs until the day it was to be retired and
replaced with new track. Instead of gradual depreciation, on the
day of retirement investors would be faced with a massive loss
in the value of their equity in the firm caused by a sudden drop
in the net value of assets. So, while the accounting justification
of the method was not very firm, there was another justification for its use: retirement accounting was very beneficial for
management. Through the use of this method, managers could
boost their bottom line significantly. Furthermore, many states
set the rates railroads could charge customers, which was often
done by placing a cap on the railroad’s profit as a percentage of
its assets. Therefore, a railroad could set higher rates and earn a
larger profit with a higher asset valuation. In that situation, the
interests of managers and investors were closely aligned against
regulators.
Management’s uses for accounting didn’t end at the creation of annual reports for investors and regulators. Accounting
could also enable management to get an analytical and objective
look at the numbers of their operations. An 1879 treatise written by Marshall Kirkman in The Railroad Gazette captures many
of the managerial uses for accounting and reports. Kirkman was
a unique authority on the development and codification of railroad accounting. He served as the General Accountant and later
Vice President of the Chicago and North Western Railway, and
he was also one of the founders of the Accounting Division of
the American Association of Railroads. In the treatise, Kirkman
lays out modern accounting theory and practices for other managers and accountants in the industry. He confirms the prevailing standard of two statement accounting, saying both “a general balance sheet, then, should embrace a clear, concise summary
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of the liabilities of the company, including its capital stock, also
the property and assets owned by it” and “the income account”
which should embrace “the earnings and incidental expense
accounts of the company” with earnings appearing “upon the
ledger as a credit balance” and expenses appearing “as debit balances upon the general ledger” with “the difference or balance
between the credit and debit” constituting “the Undivided Income of the property.”13 More interestingly, he points out that
accountants and their reports served as vitally important sources
of information for management in this period, since “to the ignorant and unthinking, the various sub-divisions of railway service have apparently little or no relation to each other… [but]
the accountant should possess an intimate knowledge of the minutiae of the different classes of accounts.”14 His approach is decentralized, and he suggests “the returns from agents and others
are, so far as practicable, allowed to reach the general accounting officer through the hands of the department officers and
division superintendents of the company.”15 He maintained that
decentralization ensures that middle management becomes far
more familiar with their operations since “[the] plan enables the
officers to acquaint themselves generally with the details of their
several branches of business without requiring special reports.”16
This use of accounting was significant and valuable to management. Managers who were neither able to look into databases
to see revenue numbers nor access client information were now
able to view detailed reports of their receipts and operations and
have an objective view of their true situation.
Marshall Kirkman was not the only manager who saw
the potential of detailed annual reports for managerial analysis.
Albert Fink, the Vice President and General Superintendent of
the Louisville & Nashville and Great Southern Railroad, also
wrote a treatise on railroad accounting. In his work, Fink clearly
lays out the importance of detailed and accurate accounting,
saying:
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If the percentage of operating expenses to net earnings, or the
cost of one ton of freight or one passenger transported one mile,
can not be used as an absolute measure of economy, or even as a
measure of comparison, and we have seen it can not, the question arises, what is the proper course to pursue in ascertaining
whether a railroad is economically operated or not?
To this the answer must be given that the only mode of ascertaining this fact thoroughly is to make an examination of each
item of expenditure incurred in the operation of a railroad, and
see whether this has been reduced to a minimum and the service
rendered to a maximum… but even that knowledge would be
of little avail unless the accounts of the operating expenditures
of railroads are kept in such a manner as to exhibit in detail not
only the expenditures, but also the amount of work performed
			
for each item of expenditures. 17

Here, Fink touches on very deep ideas. Fink is coming
close to writing microeconomic theory, approaching railroad
management as an in-depth exercise in cost minimization and
profit maximization. Accounting is central to this managerial
approach and therefore becomes a powerful manager tool for
analysis and informed decision making. One of Fink’s annual
reports composed between the years 1873 and 1874 was even
included as one of the course readings, which includes some
of his statistical measures. Fink and other managers developed
and produced many tables of data and statistics for use by investors and managers alike. Similar to the statistics used in the
nascent art of sabermetrics during this period, managers created
all sorts of interesting ratios and measures. One such statistic
was a ‘movement expenses per ton-mile’ which is equal to the
movement expenses per train mile (sourced from their own data
table) over the average number of tons of freight in each train.
Combining this with three other measures (station expenses per
ton-mile, maintenance of road per ton-mile, and interest per
ton-mile) added up to find the total cost per ton-mile.18 Like a
baseball manager analyzing a player’s batting average and field71
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ing percentage, railroad managers could use these measures
to closely analyze their cost structure. The work of these two
writers, each important and influential managers of the time,
highlight just how sophisticated and powerful accounting had
become. Quickly rising from short memos to investors, annual
reports eventually became sophisticated and detailed enough to
enable managers to use them in order to make strategic decisions.
Shareholders’ Expectations and Frustrations with Financial Reports
Just like the federal and state governments, private
investors were very interested in railroads. Similar to the tech
stocks of the 1990’s into the present, railroads were the exciting
and disruptive industry of the future during the mid-nineteenth
century. However, the motivations of private investors obviously
differed from those of the government. While the government
sought to promote railroads in order to develop the economy
of the country and build infrastructure to connect its distant
regions together, private investors were interested in making
money from their investment. With this motivation for investment, private shareholders were deeply interested in the annual
financial reports of the railroads. These reports were used by
shareholders to assess the position of the firm and the value of
their property; a dependable and trustworthy report was the
only way a shareholder could measure the value of his ownership objectively. Financial reports existed because of government
requirements and investor demand for them, however, their lack
of standardization was a source of aggravation. Many managers
were incentivized, as they still are, to fudge or outright manipulate numbers in their annual report to make their firm look like
a better investment. The variety in methods of reporting and
the desire of some managers to make inaccurate or fraudulent
reports meant that the quality of annual reports differed greatly

Penn History Review

72

American Railroad Accounting Practices

from one report to the next. This was a major issue for investors, and one that caused a good deal of frustration and fear.
In an 1879 edition of the North American Review, an
article entitled “The Mysteries of American Railway Accounting” captured many of the contemporary issues that investors
had with railroad securities. The article zeros in on the lax and
perhaps fraudulent accounting standards of the New York Central Railroad, one of the premier railroads at this time. Investors
could have forgiven the industry if the managers of some fringe
regional railroad were making questionable decisions with their
accounting. Yet, the New York Central, on the other hand, was
one of the country’s premier railroads. If there were serious issues with this railroad, that would have represented an indictment of the whole industry.
The author alleges many issues with the company, starting with a failure of the New York State regulating authorities.
As the author makes clear, “the laws of New York, which, as
they now stand, render possible, either the rendering of no
account whatever of their financial condition, by companies
whose stocks may constitute the sole means of subsistence of
otherwise helpless families, or the publishing of such statements, or reports, as are a mockery of the law, and an insult to
the common sense of every business man.”19 Without proper
enforcement of some level of quality in financial reporting,
the state of business in New York would enter into a bad state.
Honest and objective reporting was critical since “every wellregulated State very properly undertakes to control many of
its public corporation, so that, through a perfect knowledge
of their financial condition, only to be ascertained through
complete and enforced reports, the public at large may know
to what extent it is safe to trust their promises to pay, losses,
interest, or dividends, as the case may be.”20 Because of their
business, railroads were dependent on the public as a source of
capital.
The erosion of public trust and faith in the honesty of
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financial reports could threaten the legitimacy of state authorities and honest businesses in New York. However, at the writing of the article, the demand for New York Central stock was
healthy as the railroad was able to consistently pay a dividend
on the stock. The author makes this clear, saying, “for some ten
years, no perfect “general balance-sheet” has been published by
the company… instead of awakening the suspicions of brokers
and investors, [this] seems to have been entirely ignored. The
market price of the stock has been governed by the fact that it
has paid eight per cent dividends, regardless of the absence of
any proof of its intrinsic value, as indicated by the existence
of a due proportion of assets to liabilities.”21 Just like contemporary bubbles and accounting scandals, investors were either
uninterested in any problems with annual reports, despite their
objective importance, or were unaware of these issues with New
York Central’s accounting. This yields a significant observation:
regulation was critically important, for the public often did not
review annual reports closely as long as superficial indicators of
success like dividends were present.
Despite some investors’ ignorance about dubious reporting, railroads companies were still very sensitive to public
doubts about their securities. The impact of the New York Review article was damning on the railroad industry as a whole,
and it certainly was not the only place such opinions could have
been found. Enough public doubt in the industry could have
led to a severe drop in the share prices of firms across the nation. Yet beyond the dubious or potentially fraudulent annual
reports of the New York Central, the accounting methods used
in formulating such annual reports of many other railroads
could also easily lead to public distrust. As discussed earlier,
conventions such as the retirement method for valuing longlived fixed assets produced annual reports that kept in mind
only the interests of the management, rather than those of the
stockholders. The management of an individual firm was often
deeply interested in dispelling any doubts about the value of
the property behind their own firm’s stocks, especially if these
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doubts were already being vocalized by stockholders.
In response to the fear of shareholders in their firm,
the Board of Directors of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company
launched a committee, headed by William Stokely, the Mayor
of Philadelphia, to investigate its accounts and perform a full
audit of their balance sheet. Made in response to complaints
from stockholders, its explicit goal was to “meeting to examine
all the property of the Company… to make an appraisement
of the value of the roads, shops, machinery, real estate, depots,
bonds, stocks, and all other assets of the Company; also, to
examine into the liabilities and obligations of the Company.”22
Similar to the use of annual reports to generate insightful statistics for management, this committee also attempted to investigate “the wisdom of the past policy of your Company, and
to make any suggestions that we may deem likely to conduce
to its greater prosperity in the future.”23 Therefore management
could use the report along with shareholders in order to better
understand the realities of their operations. As always, accurate
reporting could benefit both groups, since objective measurements of the operation allows both investors and managers to
make strategic decisions regarding the company.
The committee quickly proved itself to be much more
than a public relations stunt from the board through the clear
repudiation of several decisions of the firm. For instance, the
committee removed a several million-dollar investment in the
United New Jersey Railroad and Canal Company from their
balance sheet because it was a “mythical account” which was
neither “part of the assets or liabilities of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.”24 Apparently, this investment was really the
property of a New Jersey railroad from which the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company leased railroad lines. Whether this mistake
was intentional or unintentional is unclear and the committee
doesn’t make a great effort to investigate this, preferring correction over investigation.
The committee also specifically mentions several costly
mistakes made by management over the years. The report zeros
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in on a group of investments on railroad lines south of Baltimore. The Pennsylvania Railroad focused its operations mainly
in the Mid-Atlantic and the Midwest, so expansion southwards
was a move out of the norm for the firm. This expansion resulted in failure, with the revenues from the lines barely breaking past the operating expenses incurred. The committee held
nothing back in their criticism of the management’s decision to
expand, stating that “in making investments south of Baltimore
without your consent, by which nearly $5,000,000 have been
lost to your Company.”25 However, the committee immediately
sought to rebuild the confidence of its shareholders, pointing out that this loss “illustrates the dangers against which we
endeavor to guard, as explained in other parts of this report.”26
Through open admission of the mistakes and an effort in the
report to explain methods to avoid another mistake like this in
the future, the committee attempted to win back stockholder
confidence not just in their reports but also their operations.
Overall, it is impressive to see the committee attempting to
win back stockholder confidence by cleaning up past mistakes
and proposing methods to avoid future mistakes. Many other
firms would have not had the same integrity to correct for past
mistakes. The zealous efforts of the committee demonstrates
the Board of Directors’ devotion to its fiduciary duty. Any past
mistakes made by management could be corrected by the committee, with shareholders associating the governance of the firm
more with the committee than with the management.
It is apparent that investor confidence in the veracity
and accuracy of annual reports was shaky at best. Especially for
more business savvy investors, the methods of assembling annual reports could often be seen as unsatisfactory as it could be
difficult to divine the true value of an investment in a firm from
their financial reports. While many firms attempted to remedy
this through investigation committees like that of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, these efforts were perhaps unnecessary. Overall, it seems that the regular payment of dividends was
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the most important factor in winning investors over, regardless
of whether such dividends were sustainable. The author of “The
Mysteries of American Railway Accounting” was an accountant,
or at least anonymously claimed to be one, so naturally as a professional he was able to zero in on issues in the New York Central’s financial reports. Laymen investors who were less able to
interpret annual reports, let alone tease out discrepancies, would
have been less sensitive about their quality so long as such issues were not directly brought to their attention. This highlights
both the importance of honest management and firm regulators, both then and now. Through a combination of the two,
business would remain in high repute, and people of all stripes
could participate in corporate ownership.
Conclusion
The accounting practices of the railroad industry in the
mid-nineteenth century were truly remarkable in both for their
sophistication and rapid development. Prior to the railroads,
businesses were never expected to release any sort of substantial reports. The business of railroads required not only large
numbers of investors and creditors but also an unprecedented
amount of equity and debt. The demand of the investors eventually led to the demand for annual reports. Furthermore, the
federal and state governments, heavily invested in the railroad
business and interested in overseeing their operations, required
annual reports to be made to supervise over the railroads’
status and operations. Thus, both the state and private investors demanded annual reports as evidence of the value of their
property. Coincidentally, the development of railroads as large
and sophisticated corporations was mirrored by the evolution
of their annual reports from brief letters to comprehensive and
sophisticated documents. Beyond the demand from governments and private investors, managers also used accounting and
annual reports as an opportunity to analyze their operations and
gain a better strategic understanding of their firm’s positions.
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Although railroads declined in national importance with
the rise of cars, trucks, and planes, they had lasting impacts on
American business. Other corporations adopted and expanded
on the model of railroads, and their corporate organizations and
practices were highly influenced by them. With that in mind,
these annual reports are especially significant. They not only offer critical insights into the relationships of firms, investors, and
regulators in the 1870’s, but they also have significant implications on how those relationships are formed even today.
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Mexico’s Cuban connection: An exception
or example of the United states’ ardent
anti-communism
Victoria Saeki-Serna (Rice University)
Introduction		
The “fundamental design” of the international communist movement and the goal of Soviet leaders, according to George
Kennan in NSC-68, was “ to retain and solidify their absolute
power” through “the dynamic extension of their authority” and
“the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the
non-Soviet world.”1 Such strategy threatened the power of the
United States; consequently, Washington policy makers believed
they had to exercise whatever extent of economic, political, or
military influence necessary to counter the communist expansion
inherently tied to the USSR. This belief lay at the core of the United
States’ foreign policy for decades - from the execution of the Marshall Plan to involvement in the Vietnam War, Washington bureaucrats willingly intervened in the domestic affairs of other nations in the name of halting the infectious spread of communism.
Mexico, notwithstanding the close bond it shared with
the dominant anticommunist power, endorsed an outlook almost antithetical to that of the United States. During the Cold
War, Mexico maintained its adherence to the Estrada Doctrine.
First established by Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada in 1930, the
doctrine advocated for each country’s right to self-determination
and emphasized the importance of nonintervention. This doctrine, alongside a concern for its own independence, informed
Mexico’s insistence on the inclusion of noninterventionist principles in the Charter for the Organization of American States
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(OAS) and its willingness to interact with communist countries.2
The world views of the United States and Mexico collided when Fidel Castro successfully led the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and established the first openly socialist state in
Latin America. The United States, after identifying the communist threat on its doorstep, responded swiftly and sought to
lead the Western Hemisphere’s response, serving as an example
for the other Latin American countries to follow. After imposing its own sanctions on Cuba, American delegates to the OAS
attempted to persuade Latin American member nations to act
as anticommunist crusaders and chastise Cuba with harsh economic and political retaliations. In their view, OAS members had
to recognize the existing expansionist threat of communists and
cease relations with Cuba to prevent its efforts to spark revolutions in other countries. While the American delegates could
not achieve their ultimate goal of having the OAS swiftly assail Cuba, they succeeded in forcing them to impose sanctions
against the island at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1964. The resolution of this meeting concluded that Cuba had sponsored “terrorism, sabotage,
assault, and guerilla warfare” in Venezuela.3 More importantly,
it resolved that in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance “the governments of
the American states [should] not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with the Government of Cuba” and required that
they suspend all their trade and sea transportation with Cuba. 4
Mexico, defying the expectations of the Washington delegation, “steadfastly opposed any obligatory sanctions against
Cuba” on behalf of the OAS even before the conference began.5 Even after Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay and Brazil (the last
OAS members to hold out on severing relations with Cuba)
adopted the resolution, Mexico still refused to follow suit. Instead, it chose to maintain economic and political interaction
with the island.6 Because of this, Mexico transformed into a
“window” from the mainland Americas into Cuba and served
Penn History Review

82

Mexico’s Cuban Connection

as the only entry point into the island from the Western Hemisphere.7 Mexico’s decision to retain its relationship with Cuba
posed a threat to the anticommunist agenda of the United States
on primarily two fronts: firstly, in Mexico’s domestic arena and
secondly, in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba, through its consistent contact with Mexico, could catalyze a communist uprising
in the country, or use it as a base to export Cuban subversives
to spark insurgencies in neighboring Latin American nations.
Considering the United States’ determination to suppress any
communist entity, the significance of Cuba as the only socialist nation which penetrated the anticommunist sanctuary that
the U.S. had sought to establish in the Western Hemisphere,
and the geographical proximity of Mexico, the predictable
course of action for the United States would have been to explosively retaliate against its neighbor. Despite all of this, the
United States government did not punish Mexico in any way.
The relationship between Mexico and the United States during this time suffered no significant harm and continued cordially.8 Why then, did the staunchest advocate of anti-communism not excoriate its neighbor when it continued to
interact with a communist country on both of their doorsteps?
Cold War Historiography: The United 			
States, Mexico, and Holes in the Literature		
For decades American scholars have studied the Cold
War, and the already expansive literature continues to evolve.
Historians have debated for decades on the origins of the Cold
War, offering political, economic, and ideological reasonings for
its inevitability. They have increasingly focused on the inseparable nature of foreign and domestic policy, leading to the upsurge in social history analyses that take the international context
of the Cold War into account. This has produced studies that
examine the effect that the war’s rhetoric had on the Civil Rights
Movement, blue collar workers, women, and other societal
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groups. As scholars explore the dynamics of social history and its
international context in more depth, political history has largely
taken a secondary role in historians’ studies of the Cold War.
The attention of Mexican political historians, on the
other hand, has only recently begun to transition from the revolutionary era to the post-revolutionary period. Popular themes
for analysis include the formation and limits of the modern
Mexican state, the nature of political representation, the creation of political parties, the character of local and national
elections, and the correlation between dissent and violence.
In the context of the Cold War, the literature has centered on
the presence of communists in Mexico, the nation’s relationship with the Soviet Union, how the international context influenced domestic policies, and how the United States’ foreign policy objectives limited the Mexican presidents’ power.9
Neither group of scholars, however, has extensively examined why Mexico’s unwillingness to match Washington’s anticommunist fervor did not cause significant conflict between the
two nations - especially given their geopolitical and economic
proximity. In an effort to fill the aforementioned holes in the
historiography, this paper utilizes a collection of declassified
documents from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) alongside archives from the State Department to investigate why the
United States did not chastise Mexico for sustaining relations
with Cuba after the OAS Resolution of 1964. More broadly, this
paper seeks to shift scholars’ attention towards the relationship
between the United States and Mexico, and how the Cold War
impacted it. It first examines Mexico’s domestic front, analyzing
how the factious nature of the Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) and the personal interest of individual politicians shaped
Washington policy makers’ understanding of Mexico’s relationship with Cuba. Afterwards, it evaluates the hemispheric impact
of Mexico’s decision to maintain relations with Cuba, noting
the United States’ concern with Cuba’s utilization of Mexico as
a base to export subversives to the Latin American mainland.
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Ultimately, I argue, the United States decided to not reprimand
Mexico for its decision to retain economic and diplomatic relations with Cuba because the bilateral relationship did not
threaten to spread communism – not to Mexico or to other
nations in Latin America. Washington bureaucrats recognized
that Mexico’s opposition to the OAS resolution originated from
considerations on party stability and prioritization of personal
interests. They understood Mexico’s decision not as a direct affront to their ardent anticommunist agenda but as a continuance of traditional political behaviors. In understanding Mexico’s
characteristic political behaviors and respecting their deviation
from the hemispheric foreign policy, the United States was able
to strengthen the country’s ability to combat communism within its borders. Mexico’s relationship with Cuba not only posed
a minimal threat of spreading communism, but it could actually have the power to prevent its dissemination. The United
States, therefore, had minimal reason to chastise its neighbor,
and rather had every reason to quietly support its decision.
Mexico’s Domestic Front: The Protection of the PRI
Paradoxically, in allowing Mexico to retain its relationship with Cuba the United States strengthened Mexico’s primary
political party and its ability to resist communism. By 1964, the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had monopolized the
political system of Mexico for nearly four decades. The CIA recognized that the party’s subsumption of “groups ranging from the
far left to the extreme right” allowed it to control “almost all elements of Mexican society” and break “the power of those it could
not absorb.”10 They identified the PRI’s broad coalition building, in other words, as the key electoral mechanism that allowed
the political party to preserve its monopolistic power. To build
stability between the ranging sectors within the party system,
the outgoing president always chose his heir to prevent internal
fights over succession, thus maintaining the party unity neces85 Victoria Saeki-Serna
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sary to emerge victorious at the polls. Additionally, the PRI did
not tolerate any external challenge to its rule and quickly moved
to suppress any opposition –from communists or otherwise. 11
An overview of the PRI clearly indicates why a neighbor with a stable one party dictatorship provided great convenience for the United States. Not only did Washington not have
to worry about an imminent communist threat on its border,
but it also rested at ease knowing that one of the most influential
countries in Latin America would not easily fall prey to communism. Hence, so long as the PRI retained their monopolistic
power, the United States could trust that Mexico’s foreign policy
decisions would not result in an internal collapse to communism.
When the end of his term approached in 1964, President Adolfo Lopez Mateos had to reconcile conflicting factions when
selecting his successor, like all previous PRI presidents had
done. Unlike his predecessors, however, Lopez Mateos had to
cater to an additional interest - the United States and the Lyndon B. Johnson administration. Earlier in the year, Johnson
had pressured the outgoing president to align Mexico more
closely with American foreign policy, creating tension between
the two nations. In a conversation between the two presidents
in February of 1964, Lopez Mateos admitted that “a number
of recent events had led his country to adopt certain international policies which had been interpreted by some people as
anti-American.”12 Johnson, subtly pressuring Mexico into compliance, responded that “he was sure that when the chips were
down Mexico would be on the side of the United States.”13
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From left to right: Presidents Truman, Johnson and
Lopez-Mateos in a meeting in 1959
Source: Wikimedia commons, National Park Service

The primary goal of United States foreign policy since
the beginning of the Cold War lay in impeding the expansion
of communism. In the Western Hemisphere, American bureaucrats believed they would achieve this through the isolation
of Cuba with OAS initiatives.14 Utilizing the OAS to advance
their goals had dominated the United States’ hemispheric
policy even before the Johnson Administration. Since 1960,
before Castro had declared himself a communist, the State Department actively sought to “impress upon Latin American the
nature and seriousness of Communist penetration of Cuba.”15
The United States repeatedly emphasized that the dangerous
problem required preventative hemispheric action in the form
of every member’s severance of relations with the island.
The United States first formally attempted to achieve
this objective by expelling Cuba from the OAS. But key nations
- such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico – opposed the measure.
Consequently, the American delegation resorted to the bribing
of right wing Central American dictators to secure the passage
of the resolution. Washington officials, therefore, viewed the
vote as an insincere and indifferent notion from Latin American countries to espouse its concerns with communism.16
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To remedy this, Washington policy makers sought to
use Venezuela’s condemnation of Cuba’s support for communist uprisings in its territory to emphasize the danger that Cuba’s communist interventions posed. In doing so, they hoped
to arouse the animosity needed to pass an OAS resolution that
would force Latin American nations to suspend relations with
Cuba. Shortly before Johnson’s meeting with Lopez Mateos,
internal deliberations in the State Department between Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann, OAS
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Special Coordinator for Cuban Affairs John Crimmins, and others concluded that “while
the Venezuelans should publicly lead the fight, we will have to
give them plenty of support [through] an intensive selling job
in Latin America.”17 Part of this “selling job,” would include
“making noise” about Cuba’s intervention in Venezuela. But
more importantly, the United States had to aid in the drafting
of Venezuela’s resolution. This resolution would condemn Cuba’s interventionism and recommend that OAS members sever
relations with the nation. By taking such an intimate role in the
process, the United States aimed to ensure that the vote on the
OAS resolution would result in the accomplishment of its most
pressing objective in the Western Hemisphere - containing the
spread of communism.18 In light of these circumstances, Johnson - in his meeting with Lopez Mateos - alluded to the upcoming OAS vote. He characterized it as a time when the metaphorical chips would be put down, and made it clear the United
States expected Mexico’s loyal support in this critical time.
Mexico’s

Domestic

Front:

Factionalism

in

the

PRI

As this unfolded on the international stage, Lopez Mateos selected Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, his Minister of the Interior,
as his successor. Described as “severe in dealing with communist agitation during his tenure” by the Washington Daily
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News, and as farther to the right than his predecessor by the
CIA, the choice pleased the Johnson administration. Fulton
Freeman, the American ambassador to Mexico, spoke approvingly of the reports that Diaz Ordaz would win.19 When
internal PRI opposition commented on this statement, upset
at the prospect that the United States would aid their disfavored candidate, neither Secretary Mann nor President Johnson chastised Freeman for supporting the wrong candidate
but rather advised him on how to manage the backlash from
Mexican press.20 The United States government, clearly approved of Lopez Mateos’ selection and viewed Diaz Ordaz
as a candidate who would continue the PRI’s monopoly on
Mexican politics. More importantly, Diaz Ordaz could potentially act more decisively against communist groups than his
predecessor because of his political standing, which further
ruled out any significant communist challenge in Mexico. 21
This choice, however, did not please all factions of
the PRI – the left wing members of the party, led by former
president Lazaro Cardenas, opposed the nomination of Diaz
Ordaz. In addition to their disapproval of Diaz Ordaz’s stance
on domestic policy issues, they also took issue with his endorsement of the OAS resolution, as they assumed the incoming administration would follow its predecessor’s example.22 Shortly before Mexico’s presidential elections and
the vote on the OAS resolution, Secretary Mann described
his trouble with securing Mexico’s vote in support for the
resolution as stemming from this factious dispute. Mann informed Johnson that while Mexico’s OAS ambassador Vicente Sanchez Gavito stood on their side, he was working
arduously to “trying to keep the party from splitting” over
the language of the OAS resolution right before the election.
As Sanchez Gavito participated in deliberations where
he fiddled “with words that everybody [could] live with,”
members of the Johnson administration, including Assistant
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for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, acknowledged that the factious bickering could prevent the US from
securing Mexico’s vote.23 The Johnson administration, in
short, understood how the PRI’s internal disputes affected
Mexico’s foreign policy decisions in the OAS and decided
to not force Mexico to vote in favor of the resolution. In doing so, the Johnson administration chose to give Lopez Mateos the room he needed to work on keeping his party united
– a decision that in the long term would benefit the United
States as it would allow the PRI to retain its dominance.
The elections in Mexico resulted with Diaz Ordaz’s
victory, but they did not end the factious tensions in the PRI.
The newly elected president had to take care to appease the
leftist faction in order to keep the party intact. The Diaz Ordaz administration consequently chose to maintain Mexico’s
disapproval of the OAS resolution, specifically voicing objection to the resolution’s “mandatory language” which obligated member countries dissolve their relations with Cuba.24
Therefore, when put into context, Mexico’s disapproval of the
resolution indicates that one of the following two scenarios
played out. Either inner party conflicts persisted in plaguing
the PRI and Diaz Ordaz continued to negotiate with the leftist faction that initially opposed the resolution, or Diaz Ordaz sacrificed his own position on the resolution and opposed
it to appease the leftist faction and keep the party united.

Penn History Review

90

Mexico’s Cuban Connection

Presidents Diaz-Ordaz and Johnson
Source: Yoichi Okamoto via Wikimedia Commons

In an attempt to secure Mexico’s vote and help the PRI
leaders unite the party, the United States rewrote the language
of the resolution on multiple occasions.25 But in the end, it did
not come as a surprise to the American delegation when Mexico voted against the resolution. As alluded to previously, Washington bureaucrats’ restraint in exercising retaliatory measures
against Mexico for its vote against the OAS resolution reflected their understanding of the internal conflicts of the PRI as
well as the United States’ own priorities in hemispheric policy.
The Johnson administration primarily helped orchestrate the
passage of the 1964 OAS resolution as a preventative measure
to limit Cuba’s ability to catalyze communist revolutions in
the mainland of Latin America. When it came to achieving
this goal in Mexico, however, the nation’s affirmative vote on
the resolution only supplied symbolic significance, whereas
the continued control of the PRI provided practical protection. If Mexico’s opposition to the OAS resolution, thus, was
the cost of precluding factious disputes in the PRI from splitting the party and ending its monopoly, the United States was
91 Victoria Saeki-Serna

Mexico’s Cuban Connection

willing to pay it in the name of the same goal that motivated
it to support the OAS resolution in the first place: suppressing all potential for communist expansion in Latin America
.
Mexico’s Domestic Front: 				
Personal Interests as the Ulterior Motive		
The trajectory of corruption in Mexican politics in the
decades leading up to the OAS vote in 1964 demonstrated that
in addition to factious disputes, personal agendas also significantly shaped Mexico’s foreign policy decisions. Public
statements made by Mexican politicians on the OAS resolution offer a glimpse into this pattern. For instance, Sanchez
Gavito reportedly “startled the New World diplomatic corps”
at the OAS in arguing that “‘the Mexican government may
fall’ if Mexico abandons its pro-Cuba policy.”26 Such an exaggerated statement undoubtedly served as a rhetorical strategy to justify Mexico’s position and possibly garner sympathy
from the other OAS ambassadors, as the economic policies of
Mexico at the time clearly disprove the veracity of the statement. Mexico would significantly suffer from severing relations with Cuba if ending the relationship signified the loss
of a significant source of critical imports or revenue from exports. Yet since the presidency of Manuel Avila Camacho in
1940, Mexico had adhered to the Import Substitution Industrialization Model (ISI). At the time of the presidency of Lopez
Mateos, Mexico remained in the second phase of this plan;
this second phase required the implementation of harsh tariffs
to protect local industry from foreign competition and allowed
domestic development to burgeon. Put simply, this meant that
Mexico did not rely on Cuban imports.27 Cuba, similarly, did
not serve as a primary destination for Mexico’s exports.28
Despite the lack of veracity of Sanchez Gavito’s
claims, the official actions of the Mexican government supPenn History Review
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port the ambassador’s suggestion that the Mexican government valued trade with the island. On two occasions, Mexico
ignored the OAS’s sanctions on Cuba – it first rejected the
OAS resolution of June 1964 cutting all economic ties with
the island and afterwards, it refused to sign the OAS sanctions adopted in July of 1964.29 Mexico’s reluctance to adopt
the measures ratified by the OAS allowed the country, as a
Mexican diplomat put it, to serve “as a window” to the state
of Cuba.30 As more accurately articulated by the Christian Science Monitor, Mexico served as a “gateway to Cuba – the
only entry point through which people and cargo [could] get
into Cuba from the Western Hemisphere on a regular basis.”31
Through this “gateway” role, Mexico facilitated the smuggling of contraband, serving as “a chief avenue through which
machinery parts and other supplies desperately needed by
Cuba” were smuggled from the United States. Mexico, moreover, served as a passageway for Soviet aid to reach the island.
A Mexican company, for instance, reportedly “sold to the Soviet Union a million tons of sulphur which will be transferred
to Cuba for use in that country’s sugar refining industry.”32
When taken together, these factors - Mexico’s limited
national economic exchanges with Cuba, the high rhetorical
value Mexican officials placed on maintaining this relationship, the regular embezzlement of funds and the smuggling of
goods to the island - suggest that PRI politicians potentially
kept economic relations with Cuba to personally benefit from
the profits generated by the illicit trade with the island. The
high value Mexican politicians placed on trade with Cuba also
insinuates that the commodities smuggled went beyond the
machinery and sulphur mentioned by the newspaper articles.
Smugglers likely transported other supplies critical to Cuba’s
survival sourced from within Mexico, such as oil, given the
lucrative profits available. These profits would have substantially increased given that the OAS resolution hindered the is93 Victoria Saeki-Serna
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land’s economic survival by demanding that the other members
cut off economic ties with Cuba – the smugglers, therefore,
would have held a near monopoly over trade with the island.
The relationship between PRI politicians of the late
20th century and smugglers parallels the relationship shared
by the modern PRI and drug cartels. In both eras, politicians
demonstrated a willingness to create political conditions favorable to the smugglers’ transfers in return for a share of the
profits. Greed and a desire for personal wealth, in other words,
could have shaped Mexico’s foreign policy decisions in regard
to Cuba. One could argue that the close relationship between
the PRI and smugglers does not parallel, but rather served as a
precedent for the modern dynamic between the PRI and drug
cartels. In allowing contrabandists to move goods through
Mexico while disregarding international agreements, the administration of López Mateos paved the way for future PRI
politicians and technocrats to accept agreements with drug
cartels if it meant personal gain. The manipulation of the political context surrounding Cuba by PRI politicians adds yet
another example of the enduring political party’s corruption.
Even if individual PRI politicians did not have direct
contact with smugglers, politicians did not need intimate connections to obtain profits from illicit commerce with Cuba.
Corrupt PRI technocrats could have easily used their business connections at the time to obtain a share of the revenue
made by Mexican companies, such as the ones that illegally
sold sulphur to the island.33 These new opportunities for revenue that Mexican companies found through their country’s
unique trading position with the island multiplied the opportunities for Mexican politicians to skim off the revenue that
the government made from tariffs. PRI politicians, in short,
had a vested personal interest in maintaining a source of revenue which was uncontested by the rest of the hemisphere and
did not hesitate to use their governmental power to protect it.
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The United States government recognized the personalist motivations of Mexican politicians and accepted this
corruption as a mechanism that helped maintain the PRI’s
power.34 Though no State Department memorandum explicitly articulated it, the foreign policy team of President Johnson
could have arrived at this same conclusion from their familiarity with the inner workings of Mexican politics. Washington
policy makers, in other words, inherently framed their reaction to Mexico’s retainment of relations with Cuba with the
knowledge of how personal interests influenced Mexican policy. In understanding this dynamic, Mexico’s refusal to accept
the OAS resolution played out not as intransigence against
the United States’ anticommunist agenda, but as a continuation of long standing relationships between politicians, Mexican companies, and smugglers. Therefore, the preservation
of the bilateral relations between Mexico and Cuba presented
no immediate affront to the United States’ objective of preventing communist insurrections. Washington, consequently,
had no pressing reason to reproach Mexico for its decision.
Hemispheric Scale: Securing			
the Mainland through Preventative Measures
While the Johnson administration worried about Mexico’s internal collapse to communism, it fretted more over Cuba’s potential to utilize Mexico as a base to launch its efforts
to support communist uprisings in Latin America. The regular
efforts of Cuban diplomats in Mexico to stimulate revolutionaries in Nicaragua in the years leading up to the Cuban Missile
Crisis made this threat seem more imminent.35 Acknowledgement of these activities affected the way in which members of
the National Security Council participated in the drafting of
Venezuela’s OAS resolution. They emphasized the importance
of cutting transportation between Cuba and mainland Latin
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America to prevent Cuba from further instigating revolutionary efforts in the continent. Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Gordon Chase, for instance, supported the OAS
resolution calling “for the suspension of all air and sea communications between Cuba and OAS countries,” noting that such
a measure would cut “the Cuba/Mexico airlink” and significantly hinder Cuba’s ability to export subversives.36 Mexico,
as mentioned, did not vote in favor of this resolution, nor did it
cut its air link to Cuba, which meant it could still act as a launch
pad for Cuban subversives into the mainland of Latin America.
Despite American politicians’ concern over Cuba’s potential utilization of Mexico as a base to export communist
guerillas, the political and diplomatic developments ensured
that this threat was unlikely to materialize. Though Washington knew that the PRI would swiftly suppress any challenge to
its rule, the more conservative character of the new Diaz Ordaz administration added additional assurance that any communist challenge would be quashed . William Raborn, Director of the CIA, in a memorandum on the security conditions in
Mexico described the political course of Diaz Ordaz as “to the
right of his predecessor,” as he catered to the “moderate and
conservative elements in the PRI [who] were exerting pressure
to restrict the influence of Castroites, Communists, and other
extremists.”37 Moreover, the same CIA memorandum on security conditions in Mexico noted that the administration had
successfully “sharply limited pro-Castroite and other anti-US
activities.”38 Mexico, in other words, would not serve as a fruitful base for Fidel Castro’s efforts to export communist uprisings to the mainland of Latin America. The Diaz Ordaz administration – more than any of its predecessors – would subdue
communist guerillas within Mexico’s borders before they had
a chance to spread their influence elsewhere in the mainland.
Aside from the heightened dedication of the Mexican
government to crack down on any domestic or Cuban commuPenn History Review
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nist activities in its territory, the United States ensured that no
Cuban effort to export revolutionaries would succeed by reinforcing the defenses of the rest of the continent. Not only did the
United States succeed in limiting the possibility of Castro sending subversives to the mainland by orchestrating the ratification of the OAS resolution - it went a step further by increasing
military and economic aid to the countries most vulnerable to
a communist attack. After the Johnson administration realized
that Mexico would not suspend its relations with Cuba after
the ratification of the resolution, it shifted its focus to protecting the governments of Central America. While anticommunist dictators and parties controlled the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua with aid from the
United States, their rule was considerably less stable than that
of the PRI’s.39 This fragility, alongside their geographical proximity to Mexico, made these countries more vulnerable targets
if a Cuban communist excursion established itself in Mexico.
Accordingly, the Johnson administration increased both military and economic aid to these countries to reinforce their ability
to repress communist insurrections. From 1964 to 1965, individual aid increased by $3,297,000 to El Salvador, $2,732,000
to Guatemala, $3,742,000 to Honduras, and $17,982,000 to
Nicaragua.40 Additionally, less than a year after the OAS voted
on requiring member nations to cease relations with Cuba, the
United States helped to establish the Central American Defense
Council, otherwise known as CONDECA. A mutual defense alliance, CONDECA ensured countries would come to the aid of
any member troubled by communist insurgencies in their territory. Washington officials also provided anti-guerilla training
to the militaries of these Central American countries with the
goal of better preparing them to suppress any communist uprisings – especially those which sprouted from Cuban support.41
The United States, in other words, took preventative measures in Central America to minimize the influence
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of Cuban communism through both stick and carrot measures. Increasing economic aid to these countries served as
a carrot, allowing Washington to curb a rise in sympathy for
communism among Central Americans by ameliorating the
economic conditions of these countries. Fortifying the militaries of Central America with a larger budget and improved
military training against communist insurgencies served as
a stick, ensuring that the extant governments stood a better
chance of defeating Cuban sympathizing subversives if they
attempted to foment an uprising. Should Cuban subversives
even succeed in leaving Mexico, the geographic areas most
likely to become targets of their operations now stood better prepared to withstand their challenge. Because of the implementation of these safeguards, the United States did not
overly concern itself with the prospect of a communist revolution carried out by Cuban subversives in Central America.
Therefore, the Mexico-Cuba relationship posed a minimal
threat of spreading communism to Latin America as a whole.
Conclusion
The United States did not reprimand Mexico for retaining its relationship with Cuba because their connection,
contrary to initial appearances, furthered the United States’
primary foreign policy goal: containing the spread of communism. In fact, the Mexico-Cuba relationship reduced factionalist debates, ensured the continued dominance of the PRI,
and reduced the possibility that Mexico would fall to communism. Moreover, Washington diplomats likely considered the
influence of the personal interests of politicians as a source of
Mexico’s foreign policy decisions. Mexico’s relationship with
Cuba provided lucrative opportunities that gave technocrats an
incentive to remain in power. Taking these factors into consideration, the United States construed Mexico’s connection with
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Cuba not as an affront to their ardent anticommunist agenda, but
rather as an indicator of the continued influence of individual
interests within the Mexican system. Both Mexican and American policy makers, moreover, swiftly moved to preclude communist insurrections catalyzed by Cuban subversives – through
harsher internal crack downs and the allocation of additional
aid to Latin American countries with more vulnerable political
systems, respectively. Any attempts from Cuba to utilize Mexico as a base to export communist revolutions into mainland
Latin America, consequently, stood little chance of success.
An analysis between the relationship between Mexico and
Cuba, in conclusion, reveals that this connection would not
spread communism to Mexico or any country in the Latin
American mainland. Instead, it strengthened Mexico’s ability
to fight communism within its borders, which in turn prevented the spread of communism into the rest of Latin America.
Requiring Mexico to abide by the OAS resolution would at
best serve as a symbolic measure, and at worst, would damage
Mexico’s ability to fight communism. Allowing for Mexico
to carry out an independent foreign policy decision, on the
other hand, served as a practical measure which achieved the
primary objective of Washington’s foreign policy – preventing Cuba’s communist agenda from contaminating the rest of
the hemisphere. For these reasons, the United States had no
reason to retaliate against its neighbor for sustaining relations
with Cuba; rather, it had every reason to support its decision.
On its own, Mexico fulfilled the guarantees that the United
States sought from every other OAS member through the
ratification of Venezuela’s resolution. Through the steadfast
domination of the PRI, Mexico proved to Washington that it
would neither collapse to communism nor stimulate its surge
in neighboring countries. In satisfying the principal goal of
the United States – the suppression of all communist expansion – prior to the resolution, Mexico did not have to abide by
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the course of action that Washington diplomats dictated. This
enabled Mexico to retain a higher level of autonomy over its
foreign policy than the rest of the OAS member nations. Indeed, as President Johnson expected, when all the chips were
down Mexico was on the United States’ side - but this did not
occur primarily from a premeditated choice. Ultimately, both
Mexico’s trustworthiness and higher degree of international
autonomy were unintended side effects of the one party dictatorship built around the PRI’s greed and desire for power.
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Ptolemaic - Egyptian Collaboration
and the Weak state problem
Alan Clingan (University of Maryland -- College
Park)
Egypt, after its conquest by the Persians in 525 BCE,
appeared as an appendage on the map of the ancient world. After
millennia of near-constant indigenous reign, Egypt’s leader was a
foreigner who did not reside in Egypt. But the end of Alexander’s
empire gave rise to the Greek-speaking Ptolemaic dynasty in 305
BCE, and with it a pharaoh residing in Egypt. The rise of the
Ptolemies is unique among the Macedonian successor states.
The inherent foreignness of the Ptolemies and their court had
to be made presentable to the Egyptian population. Egyptian
bureaucracy survived through both the Persians and Alexander
but had to be controlled and tamed to prevent uprisings and
threats to foreign power. With a pharaoh fully residing in Egypt
this became even more imperative. The Ptolemaic dynasty
had to exercise control through all the levels of administration
down to the local populace, but they had to prevent both the
mostly-Egyptian populace from rising against them and the
Greek settlers who accompanied the Ptolemies. Compromises
were made and the Egyptian populace was amenable to them,
but ultimately forces outside of the Ptolemies’ grasp undid their
strength. Their form of rule, one which worked well for the first
three Ptolemaic pharaohs, inhibited them from being able to
respond effectively when larger crises hit. The early Ptolemaic
administration revolved around a weak state that exercised power
by substantial collaboration with the Egyptians and lower-level
administrators.
PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS
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Previous understandings of the Ptolemaic state emphasized
the role of irresponsible pharaohs. While there is general
consensus that the first few Ptolemies were effective and efficient
rulers, the common explanation for the lackluster performance of
their successors usually given is simple recklessness. Exemplifying
this standard view perfectly, Monica Anemi, a classicist focusing
on North Africa and Egypt, has written, “[after Ptolemy III,]
Succeeding Ptolemies became obsessed with power that they
failed to take responsibility for Egypt and her people. Therefore,
a gradual deterioration of political power and influence became
inevitable.”1 She espouses a division of the Ptolemaic dynasty
into two parts: the old, good Ptolemies versus the young, bad
Ptolemies. The early Ptolemies became upstanding warriorpharaohs while the later Ptolemies were reduced to gluttonous
sloth-pharaohs. This conceptualization runs much deeper and
older within Ptolemaic scholarship than the statement of a single
classicist. In the second century BCE, Polybius described Ptolemy
IV (r. 221-204 BCE) as, “absorbed in unworthy intrigues,
and senseless and continual drunkenness.”2 These descriptors
thus make the collapse of the Ptolemaic dynasty the failings of
individuals.
This interpretation is appealing in its narrative simplicity,
and offers an inspiring story of rebellion against despotic rule.
It paints the Ptolemies as rulers who overstayed their welcome.
Despite hard-working beginnings they were corrupted by power.
Their tyrannical rule oppressed the Egyptian majority. The
Ptolemies overplayed their hand, forcefully disrupting Egypt
to a point where revolution rang in the air. The later rebellions
were the will of the people overthrowing their oppressors. The
rebellions were seen as evidence of the failing Ptolemaic state.
These claims function, however, only under the assumption that
the Ptolemaic state was tyrannical enough to provoke rebellion,
yet not tyrannical enough to suppress rebellion. The evidence
most often used in favor of this view is the revolt immediately after
the Battle of Raphia. Scholars have long assumed that this battle
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was the first time Egyptian troops were used alongside Greek
troops, a point that will be disproved below. Despite winning the
battle, the Ptolemaic dynasty was rocked by the Great Revolt.
As Polybius wrote, “By arming the Egyptians for his war against
Antiochos, Ptolemy [IV] had an excellent idea for the short time,
but he did not take into account the future. Priding themselves
upon their victory at Raphia, the soldiers were no longer disposed
to obey orders.”3 The Great Revolt was seen as the watershed,
dividing the pre-Raphia good Ptolemies from the post-Raphia
bad Ptolemies. This sentiment continues to be echoed: writing in
2016, Hans Hauben, a historian of the ancient world wrote that
it is important not to “play down the national(istic) factor [of the
post-Raphia rebellion].”4 These interpretations rely on the belief
that the Egyptians were oppressed and, once trained and armed,
took advantage of the opportunity to assail their oppressor. Yet
these explanations ignore the complex realities of political power
which the later Ptolemaic pharaohs faced.
Instead of a tyrannical oppressive state domineering the
Egyptian population until they broke in revolt, it is possible the
Ptolemaic state was not tyrannically oppressive. The rebellions
that threatened the Ptolemaic state were perhaps caused by forces
outside of the control of the Ptolemies rather than instigated by
a decadent Ptolemaic tyrant. It is possible, too, that the difficulty
in suppressing the later rebellions were not due to the scale of
Egyptian hatred for their Ptolemaic overlords, but because
the Ptolemaic state was weak. The older formulations of the
Ptolemaic state hardly considered these possibilities, but when
evaluating the evidence, it becomes clear that the Ptolemaic state
was not an oppressively tyrannical one, whose heavy-handed
actions accidentally instigated rebellions and found itself unable
to suppress them because of their sheer scale. Rather it is evident
that the Ptolemaic state relied on substantial collaboration with
the Egyptians before rebellions instigated by factors outside
their control exposed the fact the Ptolemaic state was weak
because it had over-relied on the Egyptian populace. To prove
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this interpretation it is necessary to evaluate all the interactions
between the Ptolemaic state and the native Egyptians.
PTOLEMAIC-EGYPTIAN COLLABORATION
The Egyptian population assisted the Ptolemaic
administration by enforcing its law. By assisting the
administration, the Egyptians would have gained some agency
over their own lives, yet they did not immediately turn this agency
against the Ptolemies. The most visible members of Ptolemaic
state bureaucracy would have been administrators functioning
as law enforcement. Interestingly, where the majority of the
population was Egyptian, Egyptian law enforcement officers
predominated. Nearly all written records show law enforcement
officers as having Egyptian names.5 These local officers themselves
relied heavily on the population they were overseeing in order
to carry out their tasks. When law enforcement required it, the
local officer would call upon the local populace to help track
down those evading justice and stolen property.6 This utilization
of the local population as the arm of the law under official
sanction by the local officer was rather similar to what later
legal traditions would call a Posse comitatus, or in more common
parlance, a posse. Given the fact that it was necessary to call
upon the populace for enforcing the law, it would be reasonable
to deduce that the Egyptian administration, at least at the local
level, lacked manpower. There existed a wide range of positions
among the local administrators, but each administrator, rather
than being assigned to a narrow purview, was tasked with a wide
range of responsibilities. They supervised projects, conducted
investigations, and assisted in tax collection on top of their
law enforcement duties.7 This broad purview left a substantial
portion of law enforcement work to fall to the citizens. It could
have been problematic to rely on the populace to enforce the law
upon local administrators’ request, as if the Egyptians refused to
assist the administration it would have lost the ability to enforce
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the law. Yet the system was successful and the native population
worked with the administration in assisting the Ptolemies.
Despite having the means to, the Egyptians did not consistently
oppose the Ptolemaic rule, indicating some level of collaboration
between the two parties.
The Ptolemaic bureaucracy, through its structure,
functioned to ingrain itself within the population. For the
average Egyptian and the lowest administrators, life under the
Ptolemies carried on as it did before. Egyptians were allowed to
retain much of their previous legal structure. Different laws and
legal systems existed for the Greeks and the Egyptian populations
even in 126 BCE.8 Even the language used at the lowest levels
remained Egyptian.9 In Egyptian tradition, the pharaoh was
an active participant in legal matters and the apex of any legal
appeal.10 Decisions made by a lower official could in theory be
appealed up ultimately to the pharaoh. Rules and judgment
were inherently within the powers of pharaoh, even the pharaoh
himself lived within a tightly rule-bound tradition.11 This
continued and expanded under the Ptolemies. Voluminous letters
and petitions flew directly from the populace to the Ptolemies,
the highest reaches of the bureaucracy, or even to any individual
thought by the sender to have some measures of influence. Low
administrators petitioned Ptolemy III (r. 246-222 BCE) for debt
relief.12 Unpaid soldiers wrote to commanders up the chain of
command.13 A tax collector’s Greek assistant received petitions
for the release of a criminal.14 Examples such as these abound
in primary sources. While many of the appeals did not reach
the person to whom they were addressed, the Ptolemies tried to
display themselves as just. Despite Polybius’s claim that Ptolemy
IV was wasteful and given to weakness, he managed to find his
emphasis on justice and mercy commendable.15 This concept that
the pharaoh was always available as a course of appeal, especially
after the rule by the distant Persians, would have given hope to
the average Egyptian and tied them closer to the Ptolemies.
Taxes played a substantial role in Ptolemaic policy towards
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the Egyptian population and proved to be a major point of
collaboration. The system of taxation in Egypt historically relied
on land and routed the payments though the temples up through
the temple bureaucracy to the pharaoh. This taxation structure was
kept intact by the Ptolemies.16 Tax breaks were granted to soldiers
to encourage loyalty, and expressions of mercy and clemency
would often be accompanied by broad temporary lessening of
taxes.17 The temples and priests, as collectors of the taxes, were
exempt from taxes.18 Broad swaths of the population faced
lessened tax burdens in an attempt to gain loyalty.19 Information
about taxes, how much to collect and from whom to collect,
did not come from supreme order of the higher bureaucracy,
but from the lower levels of administration upwards.20 Given
the reluctance of the Ptolemies to utilize Egyptian troops many
foreigners had to be enticed to volunteer in the Ptolemaic military
by promises of substantial pay.21 The ability of the Ptolemies to
grant such large tax exemptions, both periodically to all and in
perpetuity to certain groups, along with the importance taxes
played in hiring the foreign soldiers upon which the Ptolemies
depended on hints at another important source of Ptolemaic
income: plunder. The Ptolemies did not seem keen on worldconquest as Alexander was or on resurrecting Alexander’s empire
as other successor states were, but when in battle, plunder was
often a goal. This was a pattern throughout early Ptolemaic rule.
Ptolemy I’s conquests in Anatolia ended with him selling the
plunder, while Ptolemy IV, after achieving objectives, did not
translate his success in battle into further conquests.22 Plundering
and the lack of desire for conquest mutually go together. After
all, if the king intends on ruling the land, plundering would be
effectively stealing from the king, as Cyrus infamously discovered
in the Siege of Sardis.23 Through plunder, the Ptolemies were
able to lessen the tax burden, thereby gaining loyalty, while
maintaining the army upon which they relied, but this came at
the expense of long-term conquest outside Egypt.24 Perhaps the
Ptolemies never desired long-term conquest outside of Egypt at
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all, but their policies of emphasis on plunder prevented it even if
they wanted to conquer.25
The temples, as a major cog in the bureaucratic machine,
had to be supported by the Ptolemies. But given the importance
of temples within Egyptian culture, the Ptolemies had to appear
sincere in their actions towards the temples and the temple’s
bureaucracy.26 This they did through actions, performed in
rituals, and words, such as dedications and decrees.27 The temple
priests, beyond their role as temple officials of the Ptolemaic state,
also supplied officers to the Ptolemaic military.28 Around 15% of
Ptolemaic military officers were Egyptian and about 30% of those
directly held priestly offices.29 An unknown number of Ptolemaic
Egyptian military officers had ties to the priestly bureaucracy but
did not directly hold priestly ranks. These figures were determined
through analysis of letters, names, and military burials but both of
these percentages increased as Ptolemaic rule continued.30 Given
the importance of tax collection, which was the domain of the
temple, on the functioning of the military, this tied, in a bottomup fashion, the priestly elites to the Ptolemies. But the co-opting
of the temples also functioned in a top-down method. Ptolemaic
pharaohs from Ptolemy II (r. 283-246 BCE) onward created new
temples, cults, and rituals surrounding members of the Ptolemaic
dynasty.31 Any expansion of the religious infrastructure of Egypt
would have necessitated an expansion in the temple bureaucracy
to maintain the new temples, practice the new cults, and perform
the new rituals. This would have swelled the bureaucratic ranks
of the temple with priests tied to the Ptolemies for the security of
their occupation.
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Relief from Philae depicting Ptolemy I, dressed as an Egyptian
pharaoh, bearing gifts for the Egyptian goddess Hathor. Evident
is the utilization of the Ptolemies of traditional Egyptian symbolism and traditions.
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Key in Ptolemaic policy towards temples was not only
maintenance of native Egyptian religion, but also an active
movement towards reconciling Egyptian and Greek beliefs. The
creation of the god Serapis brings this to light. Serapis was a
combination of the Egyptian bull-god Apis and numerous other
attributes more often associated with Greek divinities.32 Many
attributes of Greek divinities were combined with attributes
of Egyptian divinities. For example, “aspects of the father god
and saviour god Zeus and the underworld god Pluto were also
merged with aspects of the fertility god Dionysos and the healing
god Asklepios” to create an entirely new divinity for both the
Egyptians and Greeks.33 Serapis was promoted, expanding beyond
the popularity of the previous popular bull cult surrounding
Apis, to be seen as a major god among the Egyptians.34 Among
the Greeks in Egypt, Serapis eventually had an additional role
as the husband of Isis, and through that role gained popularity
in the Greek and later Roman worlds.35 This opened up new
temples and cults that needed staffed but also it presented a link
between the Egyptian and Greek subjects. Greek subjects, despite
some reluctance, eventually accepted Serapis and even endowed
new temples for him.36 Through these temples both Greeks and
Egyptians could worship the same god together. Inserting a deity
into both religious traditions was one step towards unification of
the Ptolemies’ Greek and Egyptian populations around a single
identity.
Social mobility existed for those Egyptians who adapted
to Ptolemaic rule. The Ptolemies brought the Greek language
along with them. Greek rapidly supplanted Egyptian as the
language of choice among the highest stratum of Ptolemaic
society. Nowhere was this more prevalent than in the upper
reaches of the bureaucracy.37 The Ptolemaic dynasty themselves
were a bastion of Greek identity, out of twenty-two pharaohs only
one, Cleopatra VII, the Cleopatra known for her escapades with
Caesar and Anthony, learned Egyptian.38 The lack of effort on
part of the Greeks to reach down is understandable as they mostly
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constituted members of the upper or upper-middle classes. But
while the Greeks did not reach down, the Egyptians could reach
up.39 Learning Greek would give an Egyptian in the Ptolemaic
state a chance for promotion and many Egyptians who learnt
Greek adopted Greek names. Within one family of notaries in
Pathyris, the earlier generations used Egyptian names while later
generations used Greek names, despite the fact their knowledge
of Greek was limited.40 Knowledge of Greek, as evident by that
example, did not always indicate Greek ethnicity.41 This adoption
of Greek names has led to continued confusion regarding the
exact nature of the upper reaches of the Ptolemaic bureaucracy,
where Greek names predominate.42 While it certainly may be true
that the upper echelons of the Ptolemaic bureaucracy remained
predominately Greek, the very fact that some Egyptians, by
adopting Greek, were able to rise in the bureaucracy would have
given a sense of agency and social mobility to the low-ranking civil
servant. But social mobility could also instigate also nationalist
sentiment among these and other rising middle-class Egyptians.
The Ptolemies actively used their founder’s connection
with Alexander the Great to make a claim that Egypt was the
successor to the Alexandrian empire. From the beginning of
Ptolemaic rule there was an emphasis placed on connecting
the Egyptians to Alexander, and by extension to the Ptolemies.
The capture of Alexander’s body by Ptolemy I and its burial in
Alexandria can be seen in this light.43 If the Egyptians could be
made to feel as if they were part of Alexander’s empire, then the
threat that they would rebel against the Ptolemies, a dynasty
continually emphasizing its ties to Alexander, would be reduced.
Even Ptolemy I’s original claim only to the title of satrap aligns
with this reconfiguration of history.44 Egypt was portrayed as the
Alexandrian empire, the Ptolemies were portrayed as simply the
successors to Alexander, and Alexander himself was portrayed as
an Egyptian. Also promoted was the myth of Sesostris, a warrior
pharaoh who supposedly conquered Europe. The Sesostris myth
was “used to console the national pride of the Egyptians [after]
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a series of foreign conquests, [and it was] evidently intended to
buttress their sagging national self-confidence and…national
identity.”45 The myth is a reversal of Alexander’s conquests and
by extension the Ptolemies’, but it emphasizes Egypt as the
conqueror. Not only was Egypt Alexander’s empire, or what
remained of it, but Egypt was portrayed as having a long history
of conquering other peoples, including conquering Thrace and
Scythia, two places quite close to Greece and Macedonia.46 This
repainting of history to emphasize Egypt was, in effect, controlled
nationalism by the Ptolemies. Since Egypt conquered Greece and
Macedonia, or at least conquered peoples near such places, then
the foreignness of the ruling stratum was not actually so foreign.
By utilizing Egyptian nationalism and contorting it to suit their
purposes the Ptolemies were able to strengthen their own reign.
The Ptolemies tried to deemphasize ethnic differences
between the Egyptians and the Greeks. It would be wrong to
assert that Ptolemaic Egypt treated their Greek and Egyptian
subjects equally, but the racialized distinctions between Egyptian
and Greek were propagated by Greek immigrants. Ptolemaic
Egypt was, in some regards, seen as a promised land by many
Greeks, leading to Greek immigration into Egypt.47 Seeing
the Greek settlers as colonists helps make light of the Greek
racialization of the Egyptians, as the Greek settlers perpetuated
a viewpoint reminiscent of colonialism in later millennia: the
settlers in colonies tended to hold racist beliefs towards the natives
in contrast to the patronizing but less racist beliefs espoused by
the metropole and the central government. Given the extent the
Ptolemies tried to collaborate with the Egyptian population, it
seems doubtful the Ptolemies would have encouraged the racial
divisions between the Greeks and Egyptians.48 Drawing racial
distinctions between the Greeks and Egyptians would have
worked against the Ptolemies and their need for a collaborative
state with the Egyptians. Even as the Ptolemaic state suffered
from uprisings from the reign of Ptolemy IV onward, the
performance of the Ptolemaic ruler as a traditional Egyptian
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pharaoh continued.49 If the Ptolemies had actively racialized
the Egyptians it would have been logical for them to abandon
the imagery of an Egyptian pharaoh. Yet this did not happen.
Understanding the racialization of the Egyptians as being led by
Greek settlers as opposed to the Ptolemaic administration solves
this conundrum.

A coin of the unlucky Ptolemy IV, a ruler who faced the
first of many major uprisings which the Ptolemaic state
were unable to suppress.

EXPLAINING THE FALL
Despite all these attempts and quite substantial
collaboration and buy-in from the local population, Egyptian
uprisings occurred. While the early Ptolemies faced no serious
rebellions, this slowly changed.50 By the time of Ptolemy IV, who
reigned between 221 and 204 B.C.E., the first uprising broke
out.51 These rebellions became more common and more difficult to
suppress as Ptolemaic rule plodded on.52 But these uprisings were
closely related to environmental shocks, not directly by Ptolemaic
policies.53 When volcanic eruptions caused fluctuations in Nile
flooding or other environmental pressures, depending on the
severity of the disruptions, rebellions often occurred. Eruptions
around 246 BCE coincide with the recall of the recently crowned
Ptolemy III from battle to Egypt to deal with revolts.54 Even the
uprising by the newly-armed Egyptian troops after the Battle of
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Raphia coincided directly with a disruption in the usual flow
of the Nile caused by environmental fluctuations.55 While the
role of phalanx-trained Egyptian troops in the uprising should
not be underestimated, the fact the uprising corresponded with
environmental changes hints at a connection. The Theban revolt
of southern Egypt starting in 206 B.C.E. also aligned well with
Nile fluctuations caused by volcanic activity.56 These and other
examples of rebellions coinciding with environmental changes
are too numerous to be ignored. However, rebellions caused
ultimately by environmental changes were not new in Egypt.
The history of Egypt prior to the arrival of the Ptolemies was
littered with similar examples.57 Yet since these uprisings were a
continual occurrence throughout Egyptian history, the inability
of the Ptolemies to successfully put down these rebellions is
notable and hints at deeper trouble underpinning Ptolemaic rule.
The Ptolemaic state was weak. Collaboration with the
native Egyptian population might have made Egypt easier to
reign for the Ptolemies, but presented a problem when those
Egyptians, upon whom the Ptolemies relied, rebelled. Co-opting
the symbols, rituals, and practices of Egypt could not insulate the
Ptolemies from what was endemic in Egypt, uprisings caused by
environmental events. A strong centralized state would have been
needed to deal with the uprisings environmental fluctuations
brought, but a collaborationist state cannot be centralized.
Collaboration requires the lower-level administrators to have
significant autonomy and necessitates that the upper levels rely
on the lower levels. This fundamentally undercut the Ptolemaic
dynasty’s ability to exert control when uprisings occurred.
Between Scylla and Charybdis, the Ptolemies had to either create
a centralized state and risk continual uprisings immediately or
create a collaborationist state and risk periodic uprisings due to
factors outside their control. Given the choice they chose the
latter. Through a weak state they founded their rule; through a
weak state they lost their rule.
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CONCLUSION
The Ptolemaic state was centered on collaboration with
the native population and Ptolemaic law was enforced by a
broad swath of the Egyptian populace. The taxes were collected
by Egyptians. Temples, supported by the Ptolemies, employed
Egyptians and were a substantial presence in the lives of an
average Egyptian. Opportunities for advancement existed to
skillful Egyptians who adapted to their new Ptolemaic rulers.
Myths told to Egyptians granted them nationalism and pride in
their own agency. Ethnic and racial identifications were inherent,
but were not promoted by the Ptolemies. Structures such as the
ability to appeal legal cases, tax relief, support for the temples,
possibilities for advancement, and the promotion of nationalism
all worked to tie the people closer to the Ptolemaic state. But the
features of the Ptolemaic state that allowed it to thrive, such as
substantial collaboration with the Egyptian population within a
decentralized administration, proved a weakness. Ultimately, the
Egyptians did not rise in revolt because of what the Ptolemies
did; rather, they rose because of what the Ptolemies could not
control. Uprisings caused by environmental fluctuations were
common throughout Egyptian history, but the decentralized
and inherently weak collaborationist state of the Ptolemies made
it unable to effectively respond to them. Collaboration and
decentralization allowed the Ptolemies to rule without provoking
uprisings, but factors outside of their control caused uprisings
anyways. Through the collaborationist and decentralized state
structures, albeit tolerant and empowering to the populace in
normal times, the Ptolemies ultimately discovered the weakness
in their reign.
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Sample of Senior Honors Thesis Abstracts
The Politics of Pride: Conservative Visions of American
Nationalism in the Vietnam War Era
Anna Lisa Lowenstein
The Vietnam War resulted in a military loss that forced
Americans to reassess their notions of nationalism. The pacifist
anti-war movement evoked deep emotional responses from
both the political right and political left. These responses,
compounded by the tense economic and social pressures of the
1960s and 1970s, motivated the left to reject nationalism. In
contrast, the right embraced American pride and villainized
the anti-war movement. Using documents, news and popular
media, and literature from 1962 to 1986, this thesis argues that
nationalism was essential in binding together three disparate
groups of American conservatives in order to create a political
coalition. These groups—the white working class, intellectuals,
and far-right extremists—coalesced despite their varying social
and economic needs and different visions of nationhood. The
result was increased success for Republican politicians and a
legitimization of conservatism in the public eye.
The Unity of the Roses: How the Marriage of Henry VII
and Elizabeth of York Created the Foundation of the Tudor
Political Identity
Lorenza Colagrossi
This thesis examines how Henry VII utilized his marriage
to Elizabeth of York to create the foundation of the Tudor
political identity. It will focus on the use of visual imagery to
create national unity and justify his place on the throne. Henry’s
reign was marked by a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, he
sought to celebrate his wife’s Yorkist lineage and the legitimacy it
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provided for his rule. On the other hand, he wanted to emphasize
that he was king in his own right. Through his propaganda and
symbolism, a new image of kingship was born. The use of visual
imagery to depict Henry extended beyond the crown and into
the nobility. Henry ascended to power following a turbulent
period of civil war. The conflict left no member of the nobility
unscarred. Through visual imagery such as genealogical scrolls
and stained-glass windows, they expressed their sentiments about
Henry. These images demonstrate how their allegiances during
the Wars of the Roses impacted how they saw their new king.
This thesis compares and contrasts how Henry VII and his son,
Henry VIII, depicted themselves and their reigns. Unlike his
father, Henry VIII had a legitimate claim to the throne and did
not rely on symbolism and other means to justify his position as
king. This important distinction between the two monarchs was
reflected in the unique ways they depicted themselves.
Loyalty and Disloyalty in Urban America: A Comparative
Study of New York City and Philadelphia Politics
Justin Greenman
This thesis examines the similarities and differences
between the politics of New York City and Philadelphia during
the American Civil War. As the war progressed, both cities
diverged, with Philadelphia existing throughout politically
stable and relatively politically united, while New York City for
much of the war was divided and prone to violence and political
extremism. The central question of this thesis, therefore, has been
why did Philadelphia and New York City diverge so sharply and
if and how did conceptions of loyalty and disloyalty play a role?
My thesis is unique in focusing on how the politics of each city
were defined by a conflict over defining loyalty to the Union and
the war effort, definitions that evolved as the war progressed.
In the end, one’s loyalty and disloyalty could not be judged by
one’s religion, partisan identification, or even political allies. It
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especially could not be judged by one’s rhetoric, which was often
vague at best and deceitful of one’s true intentions at worst. In
fact, if there is one conclusion that this paper easily makes, it is
that there were no universally agreed upon, or even mostly agreed
upon, definitions of what constituted loyalty and disloyalty, only
subjective opinions altered by time and animated by the politics
of each city.
‘A Warmth of Feeling that the Lies of our Enemies Will
Never Eradicate:’ The Battle of Cable Street and the Evolving
Memory of Anti-Fascism in Britain, 1931-1949
Sam Orloff
Whereas the function of nostalgia in right-wing politics
is readily apparent in contemporary society, nostalgia on the
political left is less self-evident. To explore the role of nostalgia
in left-wing politics, this thesis considers the evolving memory
and meaning of the Battle of Cable Street, a 1936 clash in which
anti-fascists descended on the streets of London’s East End to
block Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists (BUF) from
provocatively marching through the heavily Jewish district. The
events at Cable Street are further contextualized by charting
the trajectory of the broader anti-fascist discourse in Britain
from the rise of the BUF in the early 1930s to Britain’s postwar
reconstruction under Prime Minister Clement Attlee. In doing
so, it is also possible to identify the tension between the left-wing
internationalism and the demands of domestic politics, as well as
the nature of the relationship between Britain’s Labour Party and
the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in the 1930s and
1940s.
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